Selling information for bilateral trade
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1331-1369
DOI: 10.3982/te6624 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Robert Evans und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the design and pricing of information by independent information providers for a buyer engaged in a trading relationship with a seller, and examine their welfare implications. While competitive information firms would sell full information about the value of the good, a monopolist supplies limited information in a particularly simple form—often resulting in higher total surplus than under full information, by influencing the seller's pricing decision. If only a single information structure can be offered, it takes a binary threshold form. If the provider can offer a menu of priced information structures before the seller sets a price, he offers a continuum of thresholds, inducing a unit‐elastic demand function for the seller. In both scenarios, the information firm increases total welfare when the seller's production cost is high but reduces it when the cost is low.
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APA
Evans, R., & Park, I. (2026). Selling information for bilateral trade. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1331-1369. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6624
Vancouver
Evans R, Park I. Selling information for bilateral trade. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1331-1369. doi:10.3982/te6624
BibTeX
@article{Evans2026,
author = {Evans, Robert and Park, In-Uck},
title = {Selling information for bilateral trade},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1331--1369},
doi = {10.3982/te6624}
}
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