Maximal number of mixed Nash equilibria in generic games where each player has two pure strategies
International Journal of Game Theory · 2026-12 · 55 (2)
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01020-1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 21.11.2026. Verfasst von Claus Hertling und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 16 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Universität Mannheim.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The number of Nash equilibria of the mixed extension of a generic finite game in normal form is finite and odd. This raises the question how large the number can be, depending on the number of players and the numbers of their pure strategies. Here we present a lower bound for the maximal possible number in the case of n -player games where each player has two pure strategies. It is surprisingly close to a known upper bound.
Förderung
- Universität Mannheim
Zitieren
APA
Hertling, C., & Vujić, M. (2026). Maximal number of mixed Nash equilibria in generic games where each player has two pure strategies. International Journal of Game Theory, 55(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-01020-1
Vancouver
Hertling C, Vujić M. Maximal number of mixed Nash equilibria in generic games where each player has two pure strategies. International Journal of Game Theory. 2026;55(2). doi:10.1007/s00182-026-01020-1
BibTeX
@article{Hertling2026,
author = {Hertling, Claus and Vujić, Matija},
title = {Maximal number of mixed Nash equilibria in generic games where each player has two pure strategies},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {55},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1007/s00182-026-01020-1}
}
EUVIMED