Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?
Activitas Nervosa Superior · 2009
DOI: 10.1007/bf03379558 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Activitas Nervosa Superior, 2009. Written by Chuck Stieg. Cited 1 times so far (Crossref); 27 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
Cite
APA
Stieg, C. (2009). Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?. Activitas Nervosa Superior. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03379558
Vancouver
Stieg C. Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?. Activitas Nervosa Superior. 2009. doi:10.1007/bf03379558
BibTeX
@article{Stieg2009,
author = {Stieg, Chuck},
title = {Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?},
journal = {Activitas Nervosa Superior},
year = {2009},
doi = {10.1007/bf03379558}
}
EUVIMED