Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?
Activitas Nervosa Superior · 2009
DOI: 10.1007/bf03379558 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Activitas Nervosa Superior, 2009. Verfasst von Chuck Stieg. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
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APA
Stieg, C. (2009). Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?. Activitas Nervosa Superior. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03379558
Vancouver
Stieg C. Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?. Activitas Nervosa Superior. 2009. doi:10.1007/bf03379558
BibTeX
@article{Stieg2009,
author = {Stieg, Chuck},
title = {Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?},
journal = {Activitas Nervosa Superior},
year = {2009},
doi = {10.1007/bf03379558}
}
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