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A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism

Torin Alter

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2021 · 10 (4) · 264-274

DOI: 10.1002/tht3.504 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2021. Written by Torin Alter. Cited 5 times so far (Crossref).

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Abstract (original language)

The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong (“Physicalism without supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero (“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christopher Devlin Brown (“Making room for a this-worldly physicalism,” Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523–32).

Cite

APA

Alter, T. (2021). A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 10(4), 264-274. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.504

Vancouver

Alter T. A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2021;10(4):264-274. doi:10.1002/tht3.504

BibTeX
@article{Alter2021,
  author = {Alter, Torin},
  title = {A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism},
  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {10},
  number = {4},
  pages = {264--274},
  doi = {10.1002/tht3.504}
}
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