A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2021 · 10 (4) · 264-274
DOI: 10.1002/tht3.504 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2021. Written by Torin Alter. Cited 5 times so far (Crossref).
Abstract (original language)
The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong (“Physicalism without supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero (“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christopher Devlin Brown (“Making room for a this-worldly physicalism,” Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523–32).
Cite
APA
Alter, T. (2021). A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 10(4), 264-274. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.504
Vancouver
Alter T. A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2021;10(4):264-274. doi:10.1002/tht3.504
BibTeX
@article{Alter2021,
author = {Alter, Torin},
title = {A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism},
journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2021},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
pages = {264--274},
doi = {10.1002/tht3.504}
}
EUVIMED