The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2015 · 4 (3) · 162-170
DOI: 10.1002/tht3.169 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2015. Written by Neil McDonnell. Cited 3 times so far (Crossref). Funded by: John Templeton Foundation, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
Abstract (original language)
Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation. I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains.
Funding
- John Templeton Foundation
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Cite
APA
McDonnell, N. (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(3), 162-170. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.169
Vancouver
McDonnell N. The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2015;4(3):162-170. doi:10.1002/tht3.169
BibTeX
@article{McDonnell2015,
author = {McDonnell, Neil},
title = {The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains},
journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2015},
volume = {4},
number = {3},
pages = {162--170},
doi = {10.1002/tht3.169}
}
EUVIMED