The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2012
DOI: 10.1002/tht.17 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2012. Written by Harold Noonan and 1 co-authors.
Abstract (original language)
According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan’s proposed counterexamples. As we show, she does not need to amend her analysis of possibility statements, or her theory of what properties are.
Cite
APA
Noonan, H., & Jago, M. (2012). The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht.17
Vancouver
Noonan H, Jago M. The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2012. doi:10.1002/tht.17
BibTeX
@article{Noonan2012,
author = {Noonan, Harold and Jago, Mark},
title = {The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties},
journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.1002/tht.17}
}
EUVIMED