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Not Just a Coincidence. Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis

Giuseppe Spolaore

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2012

DOI: 10.1002/tht.12 ↗

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Journal article in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2012. Written by Giuseppe Spolaore. Cited 1 times so far (Crossref).

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Abstract (original language)

So-called Locke’s thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke’s thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of the same kind. It is argued that anyone who subscribes to certain standard metaphysical arguments, which are generally taken for granted in the debate about Locke’s thesis, is virtually compelled to accept the counter-examples.

Cite

APA

Spolaore, G. (2012). Not Just a Coincidence. Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht.12

Vancouver

Spolaore G. Not Just a Coincidence. Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2012. doi:10.1002/tht.12

BibTeX
@article{Spolaore2012,
  author = {Spolaore, Giuseppe},
  title = {Not Just a Coincidence. Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis},
  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1002/tht.12}
}
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