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Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing

Theresa Wittreich

Managerial and Decision Economics · 2025-06 · 46 (4) · 2289-2313

DOI: 10.1002/mde.4452 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Managerial and Decision Economics, published online on 2025-02-03. Written by Theresa Wittreich. Cited 11 times so far (Crossref); 36 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0). Funded by: Austrian Science Fund.

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Abstract (original language)

This paper investigates the welfare effects of imperfect environmental certification and its efficacy as an environmental policy tool within a partially covered product market and price competition among firms. Using a game‐theoretic model, I find that a truth‐revealing certification mechanism – that emerges for a sufficiently precise certification mechanism or high certification fee – can enhance welfare while consistently outperforming a pooling mechanism. While greenwashing cannot benefit the economy in price competition, it may have different implications in quantity competition. The study highlights that a truth‐revealing certification mechanism is crucial for effectively reducing environmental damage, offering valuable insights for policymakers.

Funding

  • Austrian Science Fund

Cite

APA

Wittreich, T. (2025). Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing. Managerial and Decision Economics, 46(4), 2289-2313. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4452

Vancouver

Wittreich T. Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2025;46(4):2289-2313. doi:10.1002/mde.4452

BibTeX
@article{Wittreich2025,
  author = {Wittreich, Theresa},
  title = {Environmental Certification, Consumer Greenness, and Greenwashing},
  journal = {Managerial and Decision Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {46},
  number = {4},
  pages = {2289--2313},
  doi = {10.1002/mde.4452}
}
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