Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing
International Journal of Finance & Economics · 18.11.2026
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.70335 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Finance & Economics, online erschienen am 18.11.2026. Verfasst von Min Bai und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Employing the 2014 mandatory pay ceiling regulation for top executives in Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) as a quasi‐natural experiment, this paper adopts a difference‐in‐differences (DiD) approach and finds that the regulation significantly reduces corporate risk‐taking among SOEs. The reduction is more pronounced under greater policy uncertainty, among firms led by younger chairpersons, and when executives experience larger pay cuts. The decline does not reflect a broad contraction in investment. Acquisition frequency and transaction value fall significantly, whereas R&D and capital expenditures remain largely unchanged. At the same time, treated SOEs increase CSR performance, CSR disclosure and employment growth. Textual analysis of Management's Discussion and Analysis disclosures reveals a corresponding reorientation of managerial attention, with greater attention to political objectives and less attention to economic objectives. Relative political orientation also becomes more positively associated with subsequent political promotion after the reform. Overall, our findings suggest that pay ceilings reweight executives' economic and political career incentives, leading them to rebalance strategic priorities rather than simply reduce managerial activity.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Bai, M., Zhang, Z., Li, Y., & Li, W. (2026). Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing. International Journal of Finance & Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.70335
Vancouver
Bai M, Zhang Z, Li Y, Li W. Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing. International Journal of Finance & Economics. 2026. doi:10.1002/ijfe.70335
BibTeX
@article{Bai2026,
author = {Bai, Min and Zhang, Zhenwei and Li, Yue and Li, Wenjing},
title = {Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing},
journal = {International Journal of Finance & Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1002/ijfe.70335}
}
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