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When Truth Is a Public Good: Strategic Information under the Provision of Verification in Social Networks

Yashwini Mehrotra

IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science · 2026-06 · 31 (6) · 47-52

DOI: 10.9790/0837-3106014752 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2026-06. Verfasst von Yashwini Mehrotra.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Truthful information is essential for effective collective decision-making, yet its provision is often fragile when individuals behave strategically. This paper studies environments in which truth operates as a public good: while its benefits accrue broadly across society, the effort, risk, and cost of providing or verifying truthful information are borne privately. Focusing on social networks where verification mechanisms exist but are costly to use, the paper asks why truthful reporting remains limited even in settings explicitly designed to curb misinformation. I develop a theoretical framework in which agents receive private signals and interact within a networked environment that shapes both expectations and perceived responsibility. Verification is feasible, but it is neither automatic nor evenly distributed across agents. Individuals must choose whether to report truthfully, remain silent, or rely on the expectation that others will undertake verification. Crucially, behavior in this setting cannot be explained by material incentives alone. Agents form beliefs about who is likely to verify information, how credibility is assigned within the network, and whether truth-telling is socially acknowledged or simply absorbed without consequence. The analysis shows that the availability of verification can generate counterintuitive strategic effects. Rather than encouraging widespread honesty, verification may lead agents to defer or withhold truthful reporting, anticipating that others who are more visible, influential, or better positioned will bear the cost of accuracy. In such environments, truth is under-provided not because it is unimportant, but because responsibility for providing it becomes diffused across the network. The resulting equilibria are characterized by selective disclosure, strategic silence, and incomplete correction of false information. By conceptualizing truth as a public good embedded in social networks, this paper offers a behavioral explanation for the persistence of misinformation and weak corrective dynamics even under verification regimes. The findings underscore the limits of verification-based policy responses and point to the central role of network structure and strategic beliefs in sustaining truthful communication.

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APA

Mehrotra, Y. (2026). When Truth Is a Public Good: Strategic Information under the Provision of Verification in Social Networks. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 31(6), 47-52. https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-3106014752

Vancouver

Mehrotra Y. When Truth Is a Public Good: Strategic Information under the Provision of Verification in Social Networks. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science. 2026;31(6):47-52. doi:10.9790/0837-3106014752

BibTeX
@article{Mehrotra2026,
  author = {Mehrotra, Yashwini},
  title = {When Truth Is a Public Good: Strategic Information under the Provision of Verification in Social Networks},
  journal = {IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {31},
  number = {6},
  pages = {47--52},
  doi = {10.9790/0837-3106014752}
}
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