Is responsibility essentially impossible?
University of Warwick · 10.09.2026
DOI: 10.82444/warw.33523447 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift University of Warwick, erschienen am 10.09.2026. Verfasst von No author provided.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity or property is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. The connections of this issue with the distinction between context-driven and theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed. Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism than theory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated. However, since both types of account give essence explanatory depth, eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences are problematic on both types of account. Part 2 applies these considerations to responsibility in particular. The impossibility of regressive choice or control is explained. It is argued that this impossibility does not support the claim that no one is ever responsible on either context-driven or theory-driven accounts of 'responsibility.'
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APA
provided, N. A. (2026). Is responsibility essentially impossible?. University of Warwick. https://doi.org/10.82444/warw.33523447
Vancouver
provided NA. Is responsibility essentially impossible?. University of Warwick. 2026. doi:10.82444/warw.33523447
BibTeX
@article{provided2026,
author = {provided, No author},
title = {Is responsibility essentially impossible?},
journal = {University of Warwick},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.82444/warw.33523447}
}
EUVIMED