Public Policy Through the Lens of Necessity
Voices in Bioethics · 30.01.2021 · 7
DOI: 10.7916/vib.v7i.7859 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Voices in Bioethics, erschienen am 30.01.2021. Verfasst von Anne Zimmerman. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Photo by Nick Fewings on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Necessity can drive people’s behavior to extremes, and at times, can provide an excuse for otherwise criminal, illegal actions that, under normal circumstances, would be morally wrong. The law can be somewhat generous. In Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, a British court held that you cannot kill someone to eat him despite dire need.[1] Mercy or clemency was left to the crown. Necessity is not a defense to homicide except in cases of self-defense or a just war. Yet, other necessity cases show there is some room for leniency in crimes and that necessity may provide a partial or total defense in tortious wrongdoing. Maybe you can steal a piece of bread or damage property to save a life that is in imminent danger. While most agree, organ donation is not an area where the medical community should allow or encourage someone’s life to be taken for the sake of saving another, post-death organ donation is an arena where some suggest necessity, or at least high demand, should shape policy, and provide a moral defense for policies that normally would offend a sense of freedom, individuality, and autonomy. Some may categorize organ donation as an area where there is a moral duty to act, while others may find it superfluous, an extra kindness beyond that which is morally required. If it is morally compulsory, does moral compulsion justify creating a legal obligation? Analyzing organ donation through the lens of the traditional requirements of necessity sheds light on the issue of whether necessity could morally justify acting without explicit donor prior consent. Is organ retrieval ever a justifiable trespass to save a life? While an opt-out system entered freely, by vote or referendum, speaks to rules that people agree to for the sake of living in liberal society, it is also problematic given the American notions of personal choices and liberty.[2] This paper argues that necessity does not provide enough moral heft to switch to an opt-out or mandated donation system, and that organ donation is a moral good although not necessarily a moral requirement. Undertaking a system that does not require opting in poses a risk to individualism in pluralistic liberal society, something recognized under the current system of organ procurement. ANALYSIS Evidence suggests that countries with opt-out policies have a donor rate of 25 to 30 percent higher than that in countries requiring explicit consent, yet the reason for increased rates is multifactorial.[3] Generally, opt-out policies would further the public health community’s priority of procuring more organs to meet the needs of those waiting.[4] One problem with explicit consent requirements is that more people wish to donate than actually register, creating an unfulfilled potential in opt-in programs. To divide organ procurement into two broad categories, there are programs that operate with explicit consent (opt-in, the current US system) and programs which are essentially opt-out, presumed consent programs (any programs that do not require explicit consent). While the moral and ethical distinctions and the logistics may vary, the distinctive feature in the programs not requiring explicit consent is that government or society sees post-mortem organs as something available for use as a public good, or for the common good, making explicit consent unnecessary or even immoral.[5] Those attempting to justify opt-out programs within the bioethics concepts of autonomy and informed consent offer presumed, implicit, or normative consent as acceptable to override a need for explicit consent. Many countries justify their program based on presumed consent, the prevailing theory whereby consent is presumed unless a person explicitly expressed opposition to donation.[6] Presumed consent is based on the concept that most would agree, while it acknowledges that some may not agree, placing the burden on them to opt out.[7] Some argue that presumed consent is justified because removing an organ from someone who does not wish it to be donated is no worse than failing to remove one from someone who does wish to be a donor.[8] The argument is weak as arguably leaving a body alone should not be compared to the unwanted invasion post death. In many circumstances, organs are not appropriate for transfer due to health of the tissue, incompatibility with realistic recipients, or if the circumstances of the death do not allow for procuring the organs. There is no right to donate. Some argue that implicit consent (inaction is the consent) is a better rationale for opt-out programs.[9] Implicit differs from presumed consent in that with implicit consent there is evidence the person was aware and had the opportunity to voice objection. The failure to object is consent where with presumed consent, inaction is not actual consent, but merely a substitute for it. The philosophy of normative consent[10] holds that because consenting to donate organs is the morally right action, consent is unnecessary—normative consent theory would compel actions based on social norms presupposing that all (or most) agree that withholding the consent is morally wrong. That is, withholding consent would be considered void and society’s need for the organs would prevail in accordance with social norms. Normative consent, like presumed and implicit, is controversial. Normative consent goes the furthest in compelling a behavior deemed morally right and makes the broadest assumption about prevailing beliefs. None of presumed, implicit, or normative consent apply well to the US where choice and autonomy are embedded in the legal structure. Several states have addressed the possibility of presumed consent policies, but none have adopted opt-out policies.[11] A 2019 study found that in the US, 34 percent would opt out if an opt-out system were implemented.[12] In Colorado, 56 percent opposed adoption of an opt-out system.[13] Recommended policies vary: in some countries, people’s rights arguably do not include the right to control what happens to one’s body after death. One extreme would be assuming no people want to donate other than with explicit consent, like the US, or forbidding organ donation, as technically a theocracy might. The other extreme would include forcing everyone to donate without exceptions for philosophical or religious objections, a seemingly totalitarian option. Most opt-out programs fall in between, offering the ability to opt-out and various ways to register one’s choice.[14] The devastating shortage of organs provides the moral impetus to publicize and promote organ donation. It is a moral good but the degree to which it is a moral good varies and is personal. One study shows that in the US, people view organ donation as “extraordinary altruism” rather than ordinary.[15] Under some views, acting as a good Samaritan is a moral requirement where other actions are superfluous, and go beyond that morally required. Some jurisdictions have good Samaritan laws protecting those who undertake dangerous altruistic actions, and a few jurisdictions have laws creating a duty to rescue. Ethics literature distinguishes morally compelled acts from superfluous morally good acts that go above and beyond the ordinary.[16] The debate that compares rescuing a drowning child (a clear moral duty) to donating to humanitarian aid (a debated moral duty) is relevant in that the public categorizes organ donation both ways. [17] Because many see a duty to donate organs as extra rather than a moral duty, and generally donations are seen as going to an unknown person in need rather than a friend, relative, or neighbor (there is no other relationship supporting a moral duty), societal necessity could supply a potential justification for a change of policy. But as a society, adopting a policy would depend on how we see helping unknown people in need, and whether altruism, even when it is morally compelled, should be legally compelled. The immediate question is whether the elements of legal necessity could justify an opt-out policy, or any intrusion on the body of a silent or undesignated potential post-death donor. This analysis asks whether necessity could be used to eliminate the need for consent altogether. A. The Lens of Necessity In Regina v. Dudley, the starving people lost at sea killed and ate their fellow shipmate thereby saving their own lives. Acting out of necessity, the defendants committed murder and received no reprieve from the court. In the US, necessity is not a defense to murder.[18] Yet, necessity is applicable to many crimes and torts, absolving guilt or acting as a partial excuse counteracting the full force behind awarding damages. Necessity can act as a mitigating circumstance under the law. Analyzing the moral impetus for an opt-out policy or required organ donation through a lens of necessity poses several issues concerning the imminent danger to those waiting for organs, the alternatives, and the nature of the act of using a body part after death (is it property or something more special?) without the explicit consent of the donor or a legitimate proxy. The situation of necessity looks like this: Person A encounters danger X and does Act Y which deliberately imposes on Person B (harming person or property) to avoid danger X. The legal elements of necessity as a defense generally include a threat of imminent harm, an action that would prevent the harm and cause a lesser harm, and the absence of a less intrusive or a legal alternative to prevent the imminent harm.[19] The role of necessity varies by jurisdiction in the US. Courts have found prisoners may not use the necessity defense of escaping poor conditions,[20] yet generally escaping a prison fire would be a good use of the defense. In criminal necessity, prior to Roe v. Wade, doctors used saving the life of a woman as a necessity defense to performing an illegal abortion.[21] In tortious necessity, examples could include
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APA
Zimmerman, A. (2021). Public Policy Through the Lens of Necessity. Voices in Bioethics, 7. https://doi.org/10.7916/vib.v7i.7859
Vancouver
Zimmerman A. Public Policy Through the Lens of Necessity. Voices in Bioethics. 2021;7. doi:10.7916/vib.v7i.7859
BibTeX
@article{Zimmerman2021,
author = {Zimmerman, Anne},
title = {Public Policy Through the Lens of Necessity},
journal = {Voices in Bioethics},
year = {2021},
volume = {7},
doi = {10.7916/vib.v7i.7859}
}
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