Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version
PeerJ Computer Science · 22.09.2023 · 9 · e1556
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1556 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PeerJ Computer Science, online erschienen am 22.09.2023. Verfasst von Duong Dinh Tran und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi, Japan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: The JST SICORP, The European Regional Development Fund, The Generalitat Valenciana, and the European Union NextGenerationEU.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article presents a security formal analysis of the hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, a quantum-resistant version of the TLS protocol proposed by Amazon Web Services as a precaution in dealing with future attacks from quantum computers. In addition to a classical key exchange algorithm, the proposed protocol uses a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, which is believed invulnerable under quantum computers, so the protocol’s key negotiation is called the hybrid key exchange scheme. One of our assumptions about the intruder’s capabilities is that the intruder is able to break the security of the classical key exchange algorithm by utilizing the power of large quantum computers. For the formal analysis, we use Maude-NPA and a parallel version of Maude-NPA (called Par-Maude-NPA) to conduct experiments. The security properties under analysis are (1) the secrecy property of the shared secret key established between two honest principals with the classical key exchange algorithm, (2) a similar secrecy property but with the post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, and (3) the authentication property. Given the time limit T = 1,722 h (72 days), Par-Maude-NPA found a counterexample of (1) at depth 12 in T, while Maude-NPA did not find it in T. At the same time T, Par-Maude-NPA did not find any counterexamples of (2) and (3) up to depths 12 and 18, respectively, and neither did Maude-NPA. Therefore, the protocol does not enjoy (1), while it enjoys (2) and (3) up to depths 12 and 18, respectively. Subsequently, the secrecy property of the master secret holds for the protocol up to depth 12.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi, Japan.
- Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Valencia, Spain.
Förderung
- The JST SICORP
- The European Regional Development Fund
- The Generalitat Valenciana, and the European Union NextGenerationEU
Zitieren
APA
Tran, D. D., Do, C. M., Escobar, S., & Ogata, K. (2023). Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version. PeerJ Computer Science, 9, e1556. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.1556
Vancouver
Tran DD, Do CM, Escobar S, Ogata K. Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version. PeerJ Computer Science. 2023;9:e1556. doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.1556
BibTeX
@article{Tran2023,
author = {Tran, Duong Dinh and Do, Canh Minh and Escobar, Santiago and Ogata, Kazuhiro},
title = {Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version},
journal = {PeerJ Computer Science},
year = {2023},
volume = {9},
pages = {e1556},
doi = {10.7717/peerj-cs.1556}
}
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