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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version

Duong Dinh Tran, Canh Minh Do, Santiago Escobar, Kazuhiro Ogata

PeerJ Computer Science · 22.09.2023 · 9 · e1556

DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1556 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PeerJ Computer Science, online erschienen am 22.09.2023. Verfasst von Duong Dinh Tran und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi, Japan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: The JST SICORP, The European Regional Development Fund, The Generalitat Valenciana, and the European Union NextGenerationEU.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This article presents a security formal analysis of the hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, a quantum-resistant version of the TLS protocol proposed by Amazon Web Services as a precaution in dealing with future attacks from quantum computers. In addition to a classical key exchange algorithm, the proposed protocol uses a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, which is believed invulnerable under quantum computers, so the protocol’s key negotiation is called the hybrid key exchange scheme. One of our assumptions about the intruder’s capabilities is that the intruder is able to break the security of the classical key exchange algorithm by utilizing the power of large quantum computers. For the formal analysis, we use Maude-NPA and a parallel version of Maude-NPA (called Par-Maude-NPA) to conduct experiments. The security properties under analysis are (1) the secrecy property of the shared secret key established between two honest principals with the classical key exchange algorithm, (2) a similar secrecy property but with the post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, and (3) the authentication property. Given the time limit T = 1,722 h (72 days), Par-Maude-NPA found a counterexample of (1) at depth 12 in T, while Maude-NPA did not find it in T. At the same time T, Par-Maude-NPA did not find any counterexamples of (2) and (3) up to depths 12 and 18, respectively, and neither did Maude-NPA. Therefore, the protocol does not enjoy (1), while it enjoys (2) and (3) up to depths 12 and 18, respectively. Subsequently, the secrecy property of the master secret holds for the protocol up to depth 12.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Cryptographic protocolMaude-NPAParallel Maude-NPAPost-quantumSecurity analysisTLS

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi, Japan.
  • Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Valencia, Spain.

Förderung

  • The JST SICORP
  • The European Regional Development Fund
  • The Generalitat Valenciana, and the European Union NextGenerationEU

Zitieren

APA

Tran, D. D., Do, C. M., Escobar, S., & Ogata, K. (2023). Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version. PeerJ Computer Science, 9, e1556. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.1556

Vancouver

Tran DD, Do CM, Escobar S, Ogata K. Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version. PeerJ Computer Science. 2023;9:e1556. doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.1556

BibTeX
@article{Tran2023,
  author = {Tran, Duong Dinh and Do, Canh Minh and Escobar, Santiago and Ogata, Kazuhiro},
  title = {Hybrid post-quantum Transport Layer Security formal analysis in Maude-NPA and its parallel version},
  journal = {PeerJ Computer Science},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {e1556},
  doi = {10.7717/peerj-cs.1556}
}
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