Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia
Colombia Internacional · 01.07.2009 · (70) · 61-91
DOI: 10.7440/colombiaint70.2009.03 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Colombia Internacional, online erschienen am 01.07.2009. Verfasst von Richard Snyder und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 49-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to reduce corruption and improve law enforcement, can lead to violence. The cases of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Colombia show how a focus on the emergence and breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets helps explain variation in levels of violence both within and across illicit markets.
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APA
Snyder, R., & Martínez, A. D. (2009). Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional, 61-91. https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint70.2009.03
Vancouver
Snyder R, Martínez AD. Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional. 2009:61-91. doi:10.7440/colombiaint70.2009.03
BibTeX
@article{Snyder2009,
author = {Snyder, Richard and Martínez, Angélica Durán},
title = {Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia},
journal = {Colombia Internacional},
year = {2009},
number = {70},
pages = {61--91},
doi = {10.7440/colombiaint70.2009.03}
}
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