Securing Cryptographic Algorithms against Side-Channel Attacks
American Journal Of Cryptography And Network Security · 31.08.2024 · 5 (4) · 13-18
DOI: 10.71465/ajcnss1095 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Journal Of Cryptography And Network Security, online erschienen am 31.08.2024. Verfasst von Dr. Emily Thompson. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Side-channel attacks (SCAs) represent a significant threat to the security of cryptographic algorithms by exploiting physical leakages such as timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emanations, and fault injection to extract secret keys. This paper presents an overview of common side-channel attacks and explores state-of-the-art countermeasures aimed at securing cryptographic implementations. We discuss algorithmic techniques, hardware-based protections, and software-level mitigations. A comparative analysis of these techniques highlights their effectiveness, overheads, and applicability in different scenarios. The paper also outlines future research directions in developing robust, efficient, and scalable defenses against evolving side-channel threats.
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APA
Thompson, D. E. (2024). Securing Cryptographic Algorithms against Side-Channel Attacks. American Journal Of Cryptography And Network Security, 5(4), 13-18. https://doi.org/10.71465/ajcnss1095
Vancouver
Thompson DE. Securing Cryptographic Algorithms against Side-Channel Attacks. American Journal Of Cryptography And Network Security. 2024;5(4):13-18. doi:10.71465/ajcnss1095
BibTeX
@article{Thompson2024,
author = {Thompson, Dr. Emily},
title = {Securing Cryptographic Algorithms against Side-Channel Attacks},
journal = {American Journal Of Cryptography And Network Security},
year = {2024},
volume = {5},
number = {4},
pages = {13--18},
doi = {10.71465/ajcnss1095}
}
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