Beyond patronage: Subject-matter expertise and technocratic rent extraction in West Africa
Contemporary Perspectives · 20.08.2026 · 2 (2) · 76-98
DOI: 10.71350/3108610117 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Contemporary Perspectives, online erschienen am 20.08.2026. Verfasst von Simon Suwanzy Dzreke und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Digitized public administration, sovereign debt, and specialized regulatory systems have reshaped rather than replaced corruption in West Africa, creating environments where political patronage and technically mediated extraction may operate simultaneously. Conventional anti-corruption models often privilege politically exposed persons while overlooking subject-matter experts—including forensic accountants, database administrators, procurement specialists, and transactional lawyers—who may translate, facilitate, or conceal politically authorized objectives through technical and informational advantages. This study introduces the “Subject-matter expert (SME) Loot Engine,” a state-space framework modeling how informational asymmetry, organizational access, and weak oversight facilitate rent extraction within hybrid political–technical relationships. A mixed-methods analysis examines high-value procurement and financial diversion cases across Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Senegal from 2020 to 2025, integrating case analysis, covariance-based structural equation modeling, and game-theoretic simulations. The results identify informational asymmetry and technocratic agencies as important components of extraction efficiency while recognizing that technical actors may operate independently, under coercion, or in collaboration with political patrons. This study proposes an Automated Techno-Regulatory Gateway that integrates anomaly detection, specialist verification, authorized intervention, and continuous monitoring. The study concludes that effective technological anti-corruption reform requires accountable human judgment, institutional capacity, and targeted oversight, rather than automation alone.
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APA
Dzreke, S. S., & Dzreke, S. E. (2026). Beyond patronage: Subject-matter expertise and technocratic rent extraction in West Africa. Contemporary Perspectives, 2(2), 76-98. https://doi.org/10.71350/3108610117
Vancouver
Dzreke SS, Dzreke SE. Beyond patronage: Subject-matter expertise and technocratic rent extraction in West Africa. Contemporary Perspectives. 2026;2(2):76-98. doi:10.71350/3108610117
BibTeX
@article{Dzreke2026,
author = {Dzreke, Simon Suwanzy and Dzreke, Semefa Elikplim},
title = {Beyond patronage: Subject-matter expertise and technocratic rent extraction in West Africa},
journal = {Contemporary Perspectives},
year = {2026},
volume = {2},
number = {2},
pages = {76--98},
doi = {10.71350/3108610117}
}
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