Political patronage networks as institutional architects of procurement asymmetry: Weaponizing rules to exclude SMEs before corruption
Frontiers in Research · 2025
DOI: 10.71350/30624533121 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Frontiers in Research, 2025. Verfasst von Simon Suwanzy Dzreke und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study reconceptualizes state capture in public procurement by identifying political patronage networks as institutional architects rather than merely corrupt entities. These networks employ procedural norms to establish institutional asymmetry by excluding SMEs before competitive bidding. The comprehensive multi-method study—utilizing forensic network analysis of 1,422 political appointments to procurement boards, computational data mining of 24,000 contract awards across five African states, and detailed interviews with 87 SMEs, bureaucrats, and politically connected firms—uncovers a significant finding: Intentional institutional design accounts for 68% of SME exclusion. These options encompass intentionally arranged tender panels, intricately detailed technical specifications (43-page proposals for standard contracts), and meticulously defined experience thresholds. Preemptive rigging results in a win-rate multiplier of 4.3 for corporations linked to patronage. The research introduced the Asymmetry Index, a diagnostic instrument designed to quantify institutional bias through 12 weighted characteristics, aimed at assessing state capture. The findings indicate a need for a paradigm shift: corruption's most significant manifestation is the intentional establishment of exclusionary governance structures. The research indicates that incorporating SME Safeguard Protocols into national procurement legislation can lead to a 57% reduction in SME disqualifications, as evidenced by Ghana's 2022 reforms. It also recommends that international donors make funding contingent upon empirically established asymmetry thresholds. This study presents the theoretical framework, diagnostic tools, and policy suggestions necessary to eradicate exclusion and restore procurement as a catalyst for equitable economic competition. Combat systemic corruption through strategic blueprints rather than resorting to bribes.
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APA
Dzreke, S. S., & Dzreke, S. E. (2025). Political patronage networks as institutional architects of procurement asymmetry: Weaponizing rules to exclude SMEs before corruption. Frontiers in Research. https://doi.org/10.71350/30624533121
Vancouver
Dzreke SS, Dzreke SE. Political patronage networks as institutional architects of procurement asymmetry: Weaponizing rules to exclude SMEs before corruption. Frontiers in Research. 2025. doi:10.71350/30624533121
BibTeX
@article{Dzreke2025,
author = {Dzreke, Simon Suwanzy and Dzreke, Semefa Elikplim},
title = {Political patronage networks as institutional architects of procurement asymmetry: Weaponizing rules to exclude SMEs before corruption},
journal = {Frontiers in Research},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.71350/30624533121}
}
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