Kierkegaard, Skepticism, and (Epistemic) Faith
The International Journal of Kierkegaard Research · 2025-12 · 2 (1) · 73-99
DOI: 10.71227/kcvx2282 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The International Journal of Kierkegaard Research, 2025-12. Verfasst von Anthony Rudd.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kierkegaard—in signed writings as well as the Climacus works—seems to advocate a voluntarist response to skepticism: the skeptic is right that all contingent knowledge-claims are uncertain, but we can choose to believe, despite that uncertainty. This seems problematic in various ways. I argue that we can see the epistemic “belief” that Climacus opposes to skepticism as (partly) analogous to faith in Fear and Trembling. It too is a “second immediacy,” a “getting back” of our connection to the world that had been called in question by skepticism; and is based, not on sheer willpower, but on an attitude of trust in what is beyond our control, and thus on a willingness to accept vulnerability. I discuss Alexander Quanbeck’s recent argument that Kierkegaard does endorse a sophisticated form of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and I argue for the ultimately ethical nature of Kierkegaard’s response to skepticism.
Zitieren
APA
Rudd, A. (2025). Kierkegaard, Skepticism, and (Epistemic) Faith. The International Journal of Kierkegaard Research, 2(1), 73-99. https://doi.org/10.71227/kcvx2282
Vancouver
Rudd A. Kierkegaard, Skepticism, and (Epistemic) Faith. The International Journal of Kierkegaard Research. 2025;2(1):73-99. doi:10.71227/kcvx2282
BibTeX
@article{Rudd2025,
author = {Rudd, Anthony},
title = {Kierkegaard, Skepticism, and (Epistemic) Faith},
journal = {The International Journal of Kierkegaard Research},
year = {2025},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {73--99},
doi = {10.71227/kcvx2282}
}
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