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A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Failure of Foreign Interventions in ‎the State-Building Process of Afghanistan (1839–2021)‎

Sayed Habibullah Sadaat, Bakhtyar Sherzad, Safiullah Jamalzai

Nangarhar University Social Science Journal · 30.04.2026 · 03 (02) · 33-48

DOI: 10.70436/nussj.v3i01.80 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Nangarhar University Social Science Journal, online erschienen am 30.04.2026. Verfasst von Sayed Habibullah Sadaat und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 62 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study investigates the structural and historical determinants underlying the recurrent failures of foreign-led state-building projects in Afghanistan across three discrete historical intervals: British imperial engagement (1839–1919), Soviet military occupation (1979–1989), and the United States-led multinational intervention (2001–2021). Employing a comparative-historical methodology grounded in interpretivist epistemology, the analysis synthesizes archival diplomatic records, international organization reports, longitudinal aid-expenditure data, and peer-reviewed scholarship to construct a theoretically integrated explanatory model. Critically, and in contrast to existing accounts that either treat each intervention episode in isolation or privilege exclusively cultural-historical narratives—as in Barfield's foundational work—or political economy frameworks alone—as in Rubin's seminal analyses—this paper advances an original four-mechanism model: structural misfit, delegitimizing cascades, the aid-rentier pathology, and path-dependent lock-in. What sets this contribution apart is the demonstration that these mechanisms do not operate in parallel but interact dynamically across time, with each reinforcing the others to produce a self-sustaining cycle of governance failure that no single-variable account adequately captures. The findings reveal that governance collapse in Afghanistan was not episodic but structurally overdetermined: external actors persistently misread the relational logic governing Afghan political order, substituting imported institutional templates for organic authority networks while simultaneously severing the fiscal bond between the state and its citizens through massive aid inflows that peaked at approximately 75 percent of public expenditure under United States sponsorship and exceeded 90 percent under Soviet administration. These conditions collectively produced rentier governance structures in which executive accountability was oriented toward donor priorities rather than citizen demands, eroding popular legitimacy and fueling cyclical insurgency across all three eras. The study advances a theoretically coherent and empirically grounded account with implications extending beyond Afghanistan to the broader science of international state-building.

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APA

Sadaat, S. H., Sherzad, B., & Jamalzai, S. (2026). A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Failure of Foreign Interventions in ‎the State-Building Process of Afghanistan (1839–2021)‎. Nangarhar University Social Science Journal, 03(02), 33-48. https://doi.org/10.70436/nussj.v3i01.80

Vancouver

Sadaat SH, Sherzad B, Jamalzai S. A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Failure of Foreign Interventions in ‎the State-Building Process of Afghanistan (1839–2021)‎. Nangarhar University Social Science Journal. 2026;03(02):33-48. doi:10.70436/nussj.v3i01.80

BibTeX
@article{Sadaat2026,
  author = {Sadaat, Sayed Habibullah and Sherzad, Bakhtyar and Jamalzai, Safiullah},
  title = {A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Failure of Foreign Interventions in ‎the State-Building Process of Afghanistan (1839–2021)‎},
  journal = {Nangarhar University Social Science Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {03},
  number = {02},
  pages = {33--48},
  doi = {10.70436/nussj.v3i01.80}
}
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