Environmental Regulation, Administrative Friction, and Real Estate Development Efficiency: Evidence from New York City, London, and Singapore
Universal Library of Business and Economics · 31.10.2026 · 3 (4) · 17-27
DOI: 10.70315/uloap.ulbec.2026.0304002 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Universal Library of Business and Economics, online erschienen am 31.10.2026. Verfasst von Jennifer Park. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Environmental regulation is often treated as a scalar constraint on real estate development: stricter rules are assumed to produce slower or more expensive development. This article argues instead that the sustainability–development trade-off depends on regulatory architecture. Using a structured, focused comparison of New York City, London, and Singapore, it separates three channels—environmentally relevant process regulation, substantive performance requirements, and market-based valuation or incentives—and adds regulatory uncertainty as a distinct developer-finance cost. The evidence base combines peer-reviewed research with statutes, adopted planning guidance, agency processing data, and government monitoring reports current through September 14, 2026. The comparison shows that strong environmental requirements can coexist with relatively predictable development when obligations are measurable, established early, and reviewed through coordinated administrative systems. New York combines stringent building-emissions requirements with lengthy discretionary pre-certification for some projects; London layers standardized carbon metrics onto a discretionary planning system; and Singapore combines mandatory standards and Green Mark with centralized administration, digital review, and targeted incentives. The evidence does not support a causal ranking of the three cities, nor does it show that administrative speed is equivalent to environmental performance. Its contribution is instead to distinguish regulatory stringency from administrative friction and to show why delay, uncertainty, and fragmented review can be economically consequential independently of substantive environmental standards. The policy objective is therefore not simply more or less regulation, but high environmental performance with disciplined, proportionate, and predictable administration.
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APA
Park, J. (2026). Environmental Regulation, Administrative Friction, and Real Estate Development Efficiency: Evidence from New York City, London, and Singapore. Universal Library of Business and Economics, 3(4), 17-27. https://doi.org/10.70315/uloap.ulbec.2026.0304002
Vancouver
Park J. Environmental Regulation, Administrative Friction, and Real Estate Development Efficiency: Evidence from New York City, London, and Singapore. Universal Library of Business and Economics. 2026;3(4):17-27. doi:10.70315/uloap.ulbec.2026.0304002
BibTeX
@article{Park2026,
author = {Park, Jennifer},
title = {Environmental Regulation, Administrative Friction, and Real Estate Development Efficiency: Evidence from New York City, London, and Singapore},
journal = {Universal Library of Business and Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {4},
pages = {17--27},
doi = {10.70315/uloap.ulbec.2026.0304002}
}
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