The Spectacle of War: Insurgent video propaganda and Western response
Arab Media & Society · 2008
DOI: 10.70090/ae09swiv ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Arab Media & Society, 2008. Verfasst von Andrew Exum.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
To those who watched the American-led war on Iraq unfold in the spring of 2003, the fighting in most cases seemed distant and confused. No matter which television station one watched or which internet site one monitored, it was very difficult to gain a clear understanding of the events taking place during the American march to Baghdad. Reporters and bloggers could only offer their own limited perspective of the events, and watching and listening to multiple sources (which often contradicted one another) made for a cacophony of noise from which it was very difficult to gain a clear understanding of the situation in Iraq and within the collation military efforts. For the officers and soldiers of the U.S. military, by contrast, the war made sense. The fog of war was dense at times, sure, but the way the war was fought – by armored and infantry units backed by air support and commando operations – was entirely logical and in keeping with the warfighting doctrine developed by the U.S. military since the end of the Second World War. The Iraqis played by the rules, and they lost to a U.S.-led military machine far more accomplished at large-scale maneuver warfare than its nearest rivals, much less Saddam Hussein’s weakened army. The years that have followed, by contrast, have been fairly confusing for the U.S. military. It took a full three years for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to adopt the kinds of population-centric counter-insurgency tactics that have helped create a little breathing room for U.S.-led forces and Iraq’s politicians in 2007. During that time, the “enemy” quite often refused, as successful guerrillas usually do, to play by the established rules of maneuver warfare. These same guerrillas also proved more than capable in manipulating the imagery of war to further their political aims, causing General David Petraeus’s chief counter-insurgency strategist to remark that the enemy’s efforts could all to often be described as “armed propaganda” campaigns. Not only did the U.S. military have little idea how to fight a proper counter-insurgency campaign in 2003, it also had no real conception of information operations and how such operations fit into the strategy of both the insurgents and the U.S.-led coalition.
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APA
Exum, A. (2008). The Spectacle of War: Insurgent video propaganda and Western response. Arab Media & Society. https://doi.org/10.70090/ae09swiv
Vancouver
Exum A. The Spectacle of War: Insurgent video propaganda and Western response. Arab Media & Society. 2008. doi:10.70090/ae09swiv
BibTeX
@article{Exum2008,
author = {Exum, Andrew},
title = {The Spectacle of War: Insurgent video propaganda and Western response},
journal = {Arab Media & Society},
year = {2008},
doi = {10.70090/ae09swiv}
}
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