Research on Corporate Innovation and Compensation Incentives
Financial Economics Insights · 2024
DOI: 10.70088/e5w9w562 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Financial Economics Insights, 2024. Verfasst von Junjie An und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The optimal contract theory believes that the compensation contract can alleviate the agency contradiction between executives and shareholders. By making the interest goals of executives and shareholders converge, it can enhance the innovation willingness of senior executives to a certain extent, increase the innovation investment of enterprises, and then improve the performance of the company. However, the increase of investment in innovation will not necessarily improve the companys performance, and there may be an endogenous relationship between the two factors, which further complicates the issue of compensation incentive. This article sorts out the relevant literature on enterprise innovation and salary incentive, and discusses the relationship between salary incentive and enterprise innovation and its influence on the endogenous relationship between enterprise innovation and company performance. In addition, the possible influence of executive attachment characteristics on compensation incentive is also discussed.
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APA
An, J., & Lasi, M. B. A. (2024). Research on Corporate Innovation and Compensation Incentives. Financial Economics Insights. https://doi.org/10.70088/e5w9w562
Vancouver
An J, Lasi MBA. Research on Corporate Innovation and Compensation Incentives. Financial Economics Insights. 2024. doi:10.70088/e5w9w562
BibTeX
@article{An2024,
author = {An, Junjie and Lasi, Masri Bin Abdul},
title = {Research on Corporate Innovation and Compensation Incentives},
journal = {Financial Economics Insights},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.70088/e5w9w562}
}
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