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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

From Listing to Exploitation: Measuring KEV Entry Lag and Coverage Against Post-2024 Exploitation Evidence

M. F. Mridha, Taeshik Shon

Cybersecurity Advances · 30.10.2026 · 3 (1) · 51-56

DOI: 10.68556/z101qr55 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cybersecurity Advances, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von M. F. Mridha und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Background

CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is the most authoritative public statement that a vulnerability has been exploited — and, since 2024, the anchor of NIST's triage policy, with enriched analysis now promised for KEV entries within one business day of listing. Yet the catalog measures agency decisions , not exploitation itself, and the interval between the events that matter — CVE publication, KEV listing, and confirmed exploitation — has never been decomposed for the post-2024 period.

Objective

This paper specifies a measurement framework for KEV entry lag and coverage, synthesizes the published record, and identifies the gaps that the 2026 enrichment policy leaves open.

Methods

Documentary analysis of the KEV catalog's requirements and operations (2021–2026), the NVD prioritization policy of April 2026, and published exploitation-timing measurements; construction of a pipeline-lag decomposition and a gap-versus-mitigation matrix.

Results

KEV listing is a lagged, decision-based signal: it requires an exploitation determination by CISA, not merely evidence, and its coverage is bounded by the catalog's statutory scope — non-federal, non-KEV high-risk vulnerabilities fall outside both the catalog and the new enrichment priority. We identify six residual gaps, of which the deepest is structural: the 2026 policy enriches the exploited minority within one business day while formally deprioritizing everything else, converting the enrichment gap into a permanent, policy-defined class.

Conclusions

KEV-derived metrics should be reported as decision-lag measurements with explicit coverage bounds, complemented by predictive signals (EPSS) and community enrichment (ADP) — never as a complete map of exploitation.

Zitieren

APA

Mridha, M. F., & Shon, T. (2026). From Listing to Exploitation: Measuring KEV Entry Lag and Coverage Against Post-2024 Exploitation Evidence. Cybersecurity Advances, 3(1), 51-56. https://doi.org/10.68556/z101qr55

Vancouver

Mridha MF, Shon T. From Listing to Exploitation: Measuring KEV Entry Lag and Coverage Against Post-2024 Exploitation Evidence. Cybersecurity Advances. 2026;3(1):51-56. doi:10.68556/z101qr55

BibTeX
@article{Mridha2026,
  author = {Mridha, M. F. and Shon, Taeshik},
  title = {From Listing to Exploitation: Measuring KEV Entry Lag and Coverage Against Post-2024 Exploitation Evidence},
  journal = {Cybersecurity Advances},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {51--56},
  doi = {10.68556/z101qr55}
}
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