De-idealization and the Robust Mapping Account of Computation
MetaScientia: Journal of the History and Philosophy of Science · 2026
DOI: 10.68469/jvvy6y17 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift MetaScientia: Journal of the History and Philosophy of Science, 2026. Verfasst von Luke Kersten. Die Arbeit nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In The Physical Signature of Computation: A Robust Mapping Account, Anderson and Piccinini offer a bold new vision of computational implementation. This commentary critically examines their proposal. After outlining Anderson and Piccinini’s account, it argues that their discussion overlooks an important further question about physical computation: under what conditions can computational descriptions be justifiably applied to particular physical systems? This is termed the “epistemic warrant question.” The commentary argues that progress on this question can be made by appealing to the concept of de-idealization. Specifically, computational descriptions of physical systems are justified to the extent that they are supported by either (i) inter-model convergence or (ii) convergence with observational and experimental measurements over time.
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APA
Kersten, L. (2026). De-idealization and the Robust Mapping Account of Computation. MetaScientia: Journal of the History and Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.68469/jvvy6y17
Vancouver
Kersten L. De-idealization and the Robust Mapping Account of Computation. MetaScientia: Journal of the History and Philosophy of Science. 2026. doi:10.68469/jvvy6y17
BibTeX
@article{Kersten2026,
author = {Kersten, Luke},
title = {De-idealization and the Robust Mapping Account of Computation},
journal = {MetaScientia: Journal of the History and Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.68469/jvvy6y17}
}
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