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GOVERNING WITHOUT PAY: PUBLIC-SECTOR SALARY ARREARS, BUREAUCRATIC EXIT AND INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY IN POST-CONFLICT STATES

Abraham Kuol Nyuon

Pan African Journal of Political Science and Governance (Governance focus in · 30.10.2026 · 27 (10)

DOI: 10.68258/parj_psg.65796 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Pan African Journal of Political Science and Governance (Governance focus in, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von Abraham Kuol Nyuon.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A government may retain its ministries, payroll registers and civil-service hierarchies while failing to meet the most elementary obligation of employment: paying the people through whom it governs. In South Sudan, repeated wage arrears have coincided with oil-revenue disruption, inflation, administrative reform, contested political settlements and inadequate public services. Economic assessments describe these developments as symptoms of fiscal crisis; this article asks what they mean for the moral and political relationship between public officials, citizens and the state. Drawing on historical and interpretive analysis, scholarship on African bureaucracies, political settlements, professional obligation and everyday state-making, and public documents available through 3 November 2026, it develops the concept of deferred reciprocity: a governing arrangement in which officials are required to perform present public duties in exchange for uncertain promises of future remuneration. It argues that civil servants thereby furnish administrative credit to the state—not only unpaid labour but also professional credibility, networks, household resources and the continuity of public recognition. This produces a loyalty-opacity problem: continued attendance cannot be equated with political allegiance, because principled stewardship, constrained survival, strategic waiting and dependence on office can produce the same outward behaviour. The article distinguishes physical exit from partial withdrawal, parallel employment, ethical refusal and institutional persistence. It examines implications for civilian administration, education, health, policing and public trust while resisting the presumption that delayed pay automatically causes corruption or disloyalty. Its contribution is a new conceptual framework for understanding the fiscal, relational and security consequences of unpaid bureaucracy. It does not claim newly collected interviews, survey findings or a causal estimate of arrears. The policy implication is that reliable and transparent payment is a condition of legitimate public authority, not merely an item of budget execution

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APA

Nyuon, A. K. (2026). GOVERNING WITHOUT PAY: PUBLIC-SECTOR SALARY ARREARS, BUREAUCRATIC EXIT AND INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY IN POST-CONFLICT STATES. Pan African Journal of Political Science and Governance (Governance focus in, 27(10). https://doi.org/10.68258/parj_psg.65796

Vancouver

Nyuon AK. GOVERNING WITHOUT PAY: PUBLIC-SECTOR SALARY ARREARS, BUREAUCRATIC EXIT AND INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY IN POST-CONFLICT STATES. Pan African Journal of Political Science and Governance (Governance focus in. 2026;27(10). doi:10.68258/parj_psg.65796

BibTeX
@article{Nyuon2026,
  author = {Nyuon, Abraham Kuol},
  title = {GOVERNING WITHOUT PAY: PUBLIC-SECTOR SALARY ARREARS, BUREAUCRATIC EXIT AND INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY IN POST-CONFLICT STATES},
  journal = {Pan African Journal of Political Science and Governance (Governance focus in},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {27},
  number = {10},
  doi = {10.68258/parj_psg.65796}
}
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