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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

When novelty escapes the penalty: customer idea screening as a boundary condition to novelty discounting

Sean Lundie

Digital Enterprise Studies · 2026

DOI: 10.68217/e67jfp07 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Digital Enterprise Studies, 2026. Verfasst von Sean Lundie. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Evaluators are widely reported to discount novelty. Panels rank distant proposals lower, reviewers penalise unfamiliar science, and laboratory participants reject the creative options they say they want. Innovation research has largely treated this as a property of novelty itself, which implies that firms soliciting customer ideas should systematically under-select the most novel ones. We test that implication in a twenty-year archive of 47,964 customer ideas submitted to a large enterprise software firm, using three temporally clean novelty measures validated against 2,138 duplicates the firm itself identified. The predicted penalty does not appear. In the primary sample the most novel fifth of ideas is advanced 3.7 percentage points more often than the middle fifth, and the confidence interval rules out any high-novelty penalty larger than 2.3 percentage points against a base rate near thirty percent. Equivalence tests against a pre-stated bound of five percentage points reject a penalty of that size in every specification. We entered the analysis expecting the penalty. After it failed to appear, we developed evaluation architecture abductively as a boundary condition that may explain its absence in this setting. Where evaluation demands immediate commitment of a scarce resource, unfamiliarity converts into rejection. Where evaluation is staged, deferrable and routed to domain specialists, novelty can be held as an option rather than judged as an investment. Customer idea platforms are therefore better understood as organizational attention systems than as tournaments.

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APA

Lundie, S. (2026). When novelty escapes the penalty: customer idea screening as a boundary condition to novelty discounting. Digital Enterprise Studies. https://doi.org/10.68217/e67jfp07

Vancouver

Lundie S. When novelty escapes the penalty: customer idea screening as a boundary condition to novelty discounting. Digital Enterprise Studies. 2026. doi:10.68217/e67jfp07

BibTeX
@article{Lundie2026,
  author = {Lundie, Sean},
  title = {When novelty escapes the penalty: customer idea screening as a boundary condition to novelty discounting},
  journal = {Digital Enterprise Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.68217/e67jfp07}
}
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