Delineating a Rights-based Constitutional Fiscal Social Contract Through African Fiscal Constitutions
East African Law Journal (EALJ) · 27.08.2025 · 25-48
DOI: 10.66563/ealj.vi.3450 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift East African Law Journal (EALJ), online erschienen am 27.08.2025. Verfasst von Attiya Waris Waris. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A tax system is based on the constitution of a country. However as far as developing countries are concerned, relatively little attention appears to have been paid to the assembly, as a system, of the fiscal constitution’s building blocks.1 Principles of constitutional law like equality, the protection of marriage and family, and the guarantee of welfare are particularly important features of tax systems. These principles are found in both human rights as well as constitutional law. In addition, the constitution builds the framework of all governmental activities, including the tax policy; e.g. the German Constitutional Court has developed jurisprudence remarkable for its judicial activism in the tax area.2 Beginning with Adam Smith, writers have been attempting to establish criteria by which revenue and expenditure policies should be evaluated. The principles laid down by Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations are still followed today in taxation policy. Smith argued that people pay according to their abilities, according to the proportion of revenue they enjoy under the protection of the state.3 He thus covers both the ability to pay and the benefit theories of taxation. Reformulated by J S Mill ability to pay became known as ‘ability to inflict equal sacrifice’.There is continuing debate whether this principle affects both revenue and expenditure and how to best deal with it. Musgrave argues that the principle is said to have fallen short of providing the full answer for budgetary policy. He states that it deals with the raising of tax only, while expenditure is left out traditionally, considered by the ability to pay theorists to be a political matter not for economic analysis.Musgrave goes a step forward and states that no one questions the fact that the budget should be designed to maximise welfare but that the fundamental question that remains unanswered is how benefit is valued and how the valuation then depends on the manner in which the tax bill is distributed.4 Finally, there has long been a debate on taxation and fairness. Rousseau argued on the basis of the impulse to help that seems to be one of the more pleasant sides of human nature. Rousseau5 classed it among the “natural” feelings and Adam Smith also thought it was inherent to human nature.6 In addition, Henry George argued for the idea that the strong and the rich have a moral obligation to assist the weak and that need is normative in all major world religions.7 Assistance could also take the form of charity and be voluntary. Keynes stated that in framing tax principles and state finance, political and social aims must be considered together with the equitable and economic aims.8 However, within today’s context of the welfare state as well as the connection between tax revenue and expenditure within the social contract would lend itself to the possibility that the connection being made could be possibly activated through the fairness in the levy and distribution of tax income? Although African states are predominantly not welfare states they have all signed onto the international human rights instruments and these do hold welfare based concepts. Africa is of particular interest because not only does it currently have constitutions that date from the 1950s up to 2010 but these constitutions have come into place through a myriad of processes and political systems: through national referendums and constitutional assemblies, supporting existing monarchies or creating democracies and overturning dictatorships. In all these texts the fiscal provisions are always present. The result is a multiplicity of approaches to the creation of a fiscal constitution that are worth exploring and discussing to attempt to reach some understanding of what would be most suitable for a tax state attempting to achieve the level of a fiscal state. This paper will use the sociology theories of Schumpeter as well as Ormrod and Bonney on the development of the fiscal state as well as Buchanan’s political science argument on the right or power to tax, to analyse the various African constitutional texts and begin to understand the constitutional problems facing taxation and its constitutionality in Africa within the context of the behaviour of African governments. This paper, which is divided into 5 parts, is a preliminary textual analysis of African constitutions to see if they are indeed clear and precise on what the state can do in the context of the fiscal social contract and the fiscal constitution as well as how this reflects on government behaviour. Part 1 will introduce the issue. Part 2 will discuss the theory of a fiscal social contract and its place in a constitution from both a sociological and political science perspective. Part 3 will analyse the fiscal provisions in African constitutions currently with reference to the practice of the governments. Part 4 will make recommendations and part 5 will conclude.
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APA
Waris, A. W. (2025). Delineating a Rights-based Constitutional Fiscal Social Contract Through African Fiscal Constitutions. East African Law Journal (EALJ), 25-48. https://doi.org/10.66563/ealj.vi.3450
Vancouver
Waris AW. Delineating a Rights-based Constitutional Fiscal Social Contract Through African Fiscal Constitutions. East African Law Journal (EALJ). 2025:25-48. doi:10.66563/ealj.vi.3450
BibTeX
@article{Waris2025,
author = {Waris, Attiya Waris},
title = {Delineating a Rights-based Constitutional Fiscal Social Contract Through African Fiscal Constitutions},
journal = {East African Law Journal (EALJ)},
year = {2025},
pages = {25--48},
doi = {10.66563/ealj.vi.3450}
}
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