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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Petro-Politics and Democratic Deficit: Oil, Elite Capture, and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria, 1960–2024

Daniel Perekebena Kelly, Opara Ikechukwu Gerald, Amadi Chinumezi Godwin Godwin

Reciprocal: Interlegality Review · 2026

DOI: 10.66277/rir.1.1.222 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Reciprocal: Interlegality Review, 2026. Verfasst von Daniel Perekebena Kelly und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Oil made Nigeria rich, but it did not produce a legal order capable of sustaining democratic governance. Since independence in 1960, petroleum governance has been shaped by the interaction of multiple normative regimes, including formal state law, administrative regulation, and informal patronage practices. This study examines how these overlapping legalities have structured petro-politics, enabled elite capture, and reproduced a persistent democratic deficit in Nigeria from 1960 to 2024. Adopting a qualitative case study with a historical-analytical approaches, the research draws on archival materials, official records, legislative reports, judicial documents, and established scholarship. It conceptualises petroleum governance as an interlegal field in which formal legal frameworks are continuously negotiated and instrumentalised within informal political practices. The findings show that successive military and civilian administrations have operated through a hybrid normative order, where formal regulations coexist with and are frequently subordinated to patronage networks and elite bargaining. Petroleum revenues function not only as economic resources but also as instruments for reshaping the meaning and application of law, enabling elite consolidation, weakening accountability, and sustaining extractive governance. Reforms such as the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021 and the removal of fuel subsidies in 2023 introduced formal adjusments but were reabsorbed into existing configurations without altering underlying incentives. This study concludes that Nigeria’s democratic deficit is rooted not only in its petroleum-dependent political economy but in the interlegal dynamics through which formal and informal orders are mutually constituted. It contributes by demonstrating how interlegality operates as a mechanism in the reproduction of democratic erosion across regime types.

Zitieren

APA

Kelly, D. P., Gerald, O. I., & Godwin, A. C. G. (2026). Petro-Politics and Democratic Deficit: Oil, Elite Capture, and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria, 1960–2024. Reciprocal: Interlegality Review. https://doi.org/10.66277/rir.1.1.222

Vancouver

Kelly DP, Gerald OI, Godwin ACG. Petro-Politics and Democratic Deficit: Oil, Elite Capture, and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria, 1960–2024. Reciprocal: Interlegality Review. 2026. doi:10.66277/rir.1.1.222

BibTeX
@article{Kelly2026,
  author = {Kelly, Daniel Perekebena and Gerald, Opara Ikechukwu and Godwin, Amadi Chinumezi Godwin},
  title = {Petro-Politics and Democratic Deficit: Oil, Elite Capture, and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria, 1960–2024},
  journal = {Reciprocal: Interlegality Review},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.66277/rir.1.1.222}
}
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