Deferred Integrity Pay (DIP): A zero-budget-increase public sector wage reform model for developing countries
Journal of Economics and Political Economy · 14.03.2026 · 13 (1)
DOI: 10.65810/jepe.2712 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics and Political Economy, online erschienen am 14.03.2026. Verfasst von Đào PHU QUOC. Die Arbeit nennt 15 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Public-sector wage reform in developing countries is constrained by limited fiscal space, persistent corruption incentives, and weak enforcement capacity. Conventional salary increases are fiscally costly, while enforcement-based anti-corruption strategies have shown limited long-term effectiveness. This paper proposes the Deferred Integrity Pay (DIP) model, a fiscally neutral wage reform framework that increases the lifetime value of civil-service compensation without increasing current government expenditure. The model restructures wages into three components: a basic monthly living wage, an integrity-contingent deferred account accumulated over the career, and a forfeiture condition triggered by confirmed corruption offenses. By integrating institutional economics and behavioral insights, particularly loss aversion and long - horizon incentives, the DIP framework realigns individual incentives toward integrity while preserving short-term fiscal discipline. The paper develops the conceptual architecture of DIP, analyzes its incentive effects, macro-fiscal implications, and governance externalities, and outlines a phased implementation strategy suitable for developing economies. DIP is proposed as a scalable institutional mechanism for reducing corruption, strengthening state capacity, and improving public-sector performance under binding fiscal constraints. Keywords. Public sector reform; Deferred compensation; Anti-corruption; Fiscal neutrality; Institutional economics. JEL. H11; H83; D73.
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APA
QUOC, Đ. P. (2026). Deferred Integrity Pay (DIP): A zero-budget-increase public sector wage reform model for developing countries. Journal of Economics and Political Economy, 13(1). https://doi.org/10.65810/jepe.2712
Vancouver
QUOC ĐP. Deferred Integrity Pay (DIP): A zero-budget-increase public sector wage reform model for developing countries. Journal of Economics and Political Economy. 2026;13(1). doi:10.65810/jepe.2712
BibTeX
@article{QUOC2026,
author = {QUOC, Đào PHU},
title = {Deferred Integrity Pay (DIP): A zero-budget-increase public sector wage reform model for developing countries},
journal = {Journal of Economics and Political Economy},
year = {2026},
volume = {13},
number = {1},
doi = {10.65810/jepe.2712}
}
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