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The Structure of Self-Understanding in Feeling Judgment: Focusing on the Judgment of Good and Evil and Desire Arising from Reason in Part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics

Yunhee SEOK

Institute of X-Cultural Studies · 30.06.2026 · 2 (1) · 9-27

DOI: 10.65560/sof.2026.2.1.9 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Institute of X-Cultural Studies, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Yunhee SEOK.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

When we experience feelings, we naturally sense the direction of liking and disliking, approaching and avoiding. This judgment itself is not the problem. The problem comes after. When feeling judgment cannot move toward understanding the cause and necessity of feelings, and instead hardens into evaluation that fixes feelings as good feelings and bad feelings, feelings to approach and feelings to avoid - feelings are no longer the place where self-understanding begins, but become objects to be classified and processed. This paper analyzes that structure, focusing on Propositions 26, 27, 59, and 61 of Part IV of Spinoza's Ethics, from the perspective of the Science of Feelings. From the perspective of the Science of Feelings, feeling evaluation is not a way of learning and understanding the necessity of feelings themselves. It is closer to feeling interpretation, which judges feelings by their outward appearance or behavioral results. Therefore, for feeling judgment to move toward self-understanding, the evaluation that fixes feelings as something to be preferred or avoided must first be reconsidered. Spinoza places the criterion of usefulness in understanding in Proposition 26, and the criterion of good and evil in what aids understanding and what hinders it in Proposition 27. When this structure is read through the Science of Feelings, the judgment of good and evil is not an evaluation that divides feelings into good and bad. Anger or sadness is not evil in itself. Evil enters when a feeling is never asked why it arose - when it is simply pushed away. That pushing away, not the feeling itself, is what blocks self-understanding. Proposition 59 shows that activity determined by passive affect can also be determined by reason. Proposition 61 reveals that desire arising from reason cannot be excessive. The reason of desire is not a technique for suppressing or managing feelings. It is the power through which feelings understand their own cause and necessity, and act and desire more adequately following that understanding. Why did this feeling arise? Why was it judged this way? These are the questions feeling judgment can open. Fix a feeling as something to prefer or avoid, and they close. Spinoza's judgment of good and evil keeps them open. The reason of desire moves them into action. Within feelings, we learn why our own existence had to be this way. That is what this paper set out to show.

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APA

SEOK, Y. (2026). The Structure of Self-Understanding in Feeling Judgment: Focusing on the Judgment of Good and Evil and Desire Arising from Reason in Part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics. Institute of X-Cultural Studies, 2(1), 9-27. https://doi.org/10.65560/sof.2026.2.1.9

Vancouver

SEOK Y. The Structure of Self-Understanding in Feeling Judgment: Focusing on the Judgment of Good and Evil and Desire Arising from Reason in Part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics. Institute of X-Cultural Studies. 2026;2(1):9-27. doi:10.65560/sof.2026.2.1.9

BibTeX
@article{SEOK2026,
  author = {SEOK, Yunhee},
  title = {The Structure of Self-Understanding in Feeling Judgment: Focusing on the Judgment of Good and Evil and Desire Arising from Reason in Part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics},
  journal = {Institute of X-Cultural Studies},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {9--27},
  doi = {10.65560/sof.2026.2.1.9}
}
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