CODIFYING CULPABILITY: THE TRANSITION FROM IPC 1860 TO BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA 2023 AND THE FUTURE OF THE 'KNOWLEDGE' REQUIREMENT
INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW · 31.03.2024 · 6 (4) · 361-369
DOI: 10.65393/ijlrv6i437 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW, online erschienen am 31.03.2024. Verfasst von APURVA SINGH und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The adjudication of homicide under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), necessitates a rigorous inquiry into the mental state of the accused, specifically distinguishing between "intention" (dolus) and "knowledge" (scienter). While intention represents the volitional desire to cause a result, knowledge operates within the cognitive domain, signifying an awareness of consequences that are likely to occur. This dissertation examines knowledge as a distinct, independent basis for criminal liability, bridging the gap between the highest culpability of purposeful murder and the lower culpability of negligence. The study analyses the epistemic framework of liability by contrasting the statutory definitions of Culpable Homicide (Section 299) and Murder (Section 300). It explores the "fine but real" distinction in the probability of death foreseen by the offender, differentiating between acts "likely to cause death" (Section 299) and those so "imminently dangerous" that they must causing death in "all probability" (Section 300). Through an analysis of landmark judicial decisions, including State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, the research highlights how courts utilize the "degree of probability" test to determine whether an act escalates from culpable homicide to murder. Furthermore, the dissertation investigates the complex boundary between "knowledge" and "rashness/negligence" (Section 304A). It critiques the judiciary’s evolving approach to "attributed knowledge" in cases of vehicular homicide involving intoxication, such as Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, where courts impute knowledge to bridge the gap between objective negligence and subjective culpability. Contrastingly, the study notes the higher evidentiary threshold required in corporate and medical negligence cases, such as the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and Jacob Mathew, where "actual knowledge" remains a strict requirement.
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APA
SINGH, A., & SINGH, R. K. (2024). CODIFYING CULPABILITY: THE TRANSITION FROM IPC 1860 TO BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA 2023 AND THE FUTURE OF THE 'KNOWLEDGE' REQUIREMENT. INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW, 6(4), 361-369. https://doi.org/10.65393/ijlrv6i437
Vancouver
SINGH A, SINGH RK. CODIFYING CULPABILITY: THE TRANSITION FROM IPC 1860 TO BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA 2023 AND THE FUTURE OF THE 'KNOWLEDGE' REQUIREMENT. INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW. 2024;6(4):361-369. doi:10.65393/ijlrv6i437
BibTeX
@article{SINGH2024,
author = {SINGH, APURVA and SINGH, RAJEEV KUMAR},
title = {CODIFYING CULPABILITY: THE TRANSITION FROM IPC 1860 TO BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA 2023 AND THE FUTURE OF THE 'KNOWLEDGE' REQUIREMENT},
journal = {INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW},
year = {2024},
volume = {6},
number = {4},
pages = {361--369},
doi = {10.65393/ijlrv6i437}
}
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