Algorithmic Brinkmanship: How Artificial Intelligence Reshapes Escalation,Commitment, and De-escalation in the Game of Chicken
Unveiling seven continents yearbook journal · 18.05.2026
DOI: 10.65326/u7y566770 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Unveiling seven continents yearbook journal, online erschienen am 18.05.2026. Verfasst von Jose Garcia und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The game of Chicken remains a powerful model for the study of confrontation under mutual danger. Each player prefers victory to concession, concession to collision, and collision least of all. But the classical model was rooted in human perception, intentional signaling, and manifest commitment. This article contends that AI alters the internal logic of Chicken by changing escalation tempo, commitment credibility, signal interpretation, and practical conditions of de-escalation. The article uses bargaining theory and commitment-problem analysis to advance a qualitative conceptual framework that builds on peer-reviewed literature in game theory, crisis bargaining, strategic studies, human-autonomy teaming, and AI governance. The research gap is targeted at a specific theoretical gap: existing literature discusses AI and strategic stability, but it does not explain how AI changes the brinkmanship mechanism in Chicken-like settings where credibility is based on the capacity to seem willing or unable to walk away, but still keep a last-moment exit. This article introduces the concept of algorithmic brinkmanship, defined as the use, display or reliance on AI-enabled perception, prediction, delegation and automation to influence an adversary's beliefs under mutually harmful risk. It proposes six theoretical propositions. AI increases escalation risk when speed and opacity shorten deliberation; it increases commitment when delegation appears automatic; it undermines signaling when adversaries cannot infer thresholds or override capacity; it encourages de-escalation when systems are reversible, explainable, and institutionally governed; AI governance mediates the relationship between capability and strategic stability; and it transforms Chicken from a contest of observable resolve to a contest of human-machine credibility and control. The article ends by arguing that for high-stakes strategic interaction, AI governance needs to pay attention not only to accuracy or autonomy, but also to pauseability, interpretability, auditability and credible human restraint.
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APA
Garcia, J., Souleiman, H. A., & Souleiman, I. A. (2026). Algorithmic Brinkmanship: How Artificial Intelligence Reshapes Escalation,Commitment, and De-escalation in the Game of Chicken. Unveiling seven continents yearbook journal. https://doi.org/10.65326/u7y566770
Vancouver
Garcia J, Souleiman HA, Souleiman IA. Algorithmic Brinkmanship: How Artificial Intelligence Reshapes Escalation,Commitment, and De-escalation in the Game of Chicken. Unveiling seven continents yearbook journal. 2026. doi:10.65326/u7y566770
BibTeX
@article{Garcia2026,
author = {Garcia, Jose and Souleiman, Habib Al and Souleiman, Ibrahim Al},
title = {Algorithmic Brinkmanship: How Artificial Intelligence Reshapes Escalation,Commitment, and De-escalation in the Game of Chicken},
journal = {Unveiling seven continents yearbook journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.65326/u7y566770}
}
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