The Force Development of the ROK Ground Forces through a Comparative Lessons-Learned Analysis of the Ukraine War and Operation Epic Fury–True Promise IV: Focusing on Defense-First and Offense-Following Redesign
Ground Forces Institute · 30.06.2026 · 2 (1) · 5-29
DOI: 10.64536/gfds.2026.2.1.1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ground Forces Institute, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Hackyoung BAE.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study examines how the Republic of Korea ground forces should evolve under drone-centric warfare by conducting a comparative lessons-learned analysis of the Ukraine War, the U.S. campaign against Iran in 2026 known as Operation Epic Fury, and the related Iranian operational pattern referred to as True Promise IV. Existing scholarship has largely focused on the offensive utility of drones, including reconnaissance, target acquisition, precision strike, and human-machine teaming. Yet recent battlefield cases suggest a deeper transformation: the persistent transparency of the battlefield, the structural exposure of top-attack vulnerabilities, the growing fragility of sustainment networks, the rising cost burden of defense, and the increasing vulnerability of rear bases and critical infrastructure. Employing a qualitative comparative case-study approach combined with lessons-learned analysis, this article evaluates both cases through four analytical lenses: changes in defense, changes in offense, cost-exchange ratio and sustainability, and the speed of organizational adaptation. The Ukraine War demonstrates how commercial reconnaissance drones, FPV loitering attack drones, loitering munitions, and artillery-linked UAVs compressed the detect-target-engage-assess cycle at the infantry and maneuver-force level. By contrast, Epic Fury and True Promise IV highlight the operational- and theater-level implications of low-cost one-way attack drones, long-range precision strike, and mass drone-missile salvos that impose pressure on rear bases, air defense systems, and overall war sustainability. The study makes four main arguments. First, drones are no longer auxiliary assets but structural variables that connect the tactical, operational, and theater levels of war. Second, the primary priority for ground force development should not be offensive expansion, but the redesign of defense and survivability. Third, offensive drone capabilities should be developed on top of a resilient defensive foundation and integrated into a broader network linking reconnaissance, command and control, fires, and battle damage assessment. Fourth, the ROK ground forces should build a Korean model of adaptation that reflects the peninsula’s short depth, urban concentration, North Korean drone-artillery-missile threats, alliance operational structures, manpower decline, and acquisition constraints.
Zitieren
APA
BAE, H. (2026). The Force Development of the ROK Ground Forces through a Comparative Lessons-Learned Analysis of the Ukraine War and Operation Epic Fury–True Promise IV: Focusing on Defense-First and Offense-Following Redesign. Ground Forces Institute, 2(1), 5-29. https://doi.org/10.64536/gfds.2026.2.1.1
Vancouver
BAE H. The Force Development of the ROK Ground Forces through a Comparative Lessons-Learned Analysis of the Ukraine War and Operation Epic Fury–True Promise IV: Focusing on Defense-First and Offense-Following Redesign. Ground Forces Institute. 2026;2(1):5-29. doi:10.64536/gfds.2026.2.1.1
BibTeX
@article{BAE2026,
author = {BAE, Hackyoung},
title = {The Force Development of the ROK Ground Forces through a Comparative Lessons-Learned Analysis of the Ukraine War and Operation Epic Fury–True Promise IV: Focusing on Defense-First and Offense-Following Redesign},
journal = {Ground Forces Institute},
year = {2026},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {5--29},
doi = {10.64536/gfds.2026.2.1.1}
}
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