Strategic Adaptation Under Fire: U.S. Carrier Aviation and the Institutional Learning Curve, 1929–1944
Military Strategy Magazine · 06.08.2026 · 1-1
DOI: 10.64148/msm.article.15265 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Military Strategy Magazine, online erschienen am 06.08.2026. Verfasst von Marcus Jones.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines the rise of U.S. carrier aviation during the Second World War as a case study in institutional adaptation under conditions of technological disruption and combat pressure. It argues that strategic advantage emerged from the Navy’s evolving ability to integrate doctrine, command structures, training, and operational learning into a coherent system of warfare. By tracing the transition from the improvised carrier operations of 1942 to the mature fast carrier task forces of 1944, the article offers a broader analytical model for understanding how military organizations transform technological potential into strategic effect.
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APA
Jones, M. (2026). Strategic Adaptation Under Fire: U.S. Carrier Aviation and the Institutional Learning Curve, 1929–1944. Military Strategy Magazine, 1-1. https://doi.org/10.64148/msm.article.15265
Vancouver
Jones M. Strategic Adaptation Under Fire: U.S. Carrier Aviation and the Institutional Learning Curve, 1929–1944. Military Strategy Magazine. 2026:1-1. doi:10.64148/msm.article.15265
BibTeX
@article{Jones2026,
author = {Jones, Marcus},
title = {Strategic Adaptation Under Fire: U.S. Carrier Aviation and the Institutional Learning Curve, 1929–1944},
journal = {Military Strategy Magazine},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--1},
doi = {10.64148/msm.article.15265}
}
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