How Do Government Guidance Funds Cultivate “Patient Capital”? —— An Empirical Study on Asymmetric Game Based on Investment Leverage and Exit Mechanism of Sci-Tech Innovation Enterprises
Finance and Trade Dynamics · 2026
DOI: 10.63808/ftd.v2i1.299 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Finance and Trade Dynamics, 2026. Verfasst von Jingdong Huang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Against the macro backdrop of accelerating the cultivation of “new quality productive forces”, sci-tech innovation enterprises face a “valley of death” dilemma due to the term mismatch between their long-cycle, high-risk characteristics and social capital’s short-term profit-seeking preference. This paper explores how Government Guidance Funds (GGFs) transform short-term capital into “patient capital” through risk-sharing and certification effects. Using a sample of sci-tech enterprises receiving VC/PE investments from 2010 to 2024 (12,846 valid samples) and data from CVSource, Zero2IPO, and CSMAR databases, empirical analysis is conducted via Staggered DID, PSM-DID, and IV methods. The findings are: (1) GGF participation significantly increases social capital financing scale (financial leverage) and extends holding periods (time leverage), with stronger effects on early-round projects; (2) Mechanism tests show that “implicit guarantee” risk-sharing and “signal sending” certification are core channels; (3) The exit mechanism has a non-linear moderating effect, as active S-fund markets and smooth M&A channels enhance GGF effects by reducing liquidity anxiety. Marginal contributions include integrating mixed oligopoly models with signal transmission theory and using “holding period” as a direct measure of patient capital. Policy recommendations include optimizing GGF assessment, cultivating multi-level exit ecosystems, and implementing classified supervision.
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APA
Huang, J., Zhang, X., & Jin, H. (2026). How Do Government Guidance Funds Cultivate “Patient Capital”? —— An Empirical Study on Asymmetric Game Based on Investment Leverage and Exit Mechanism of Sci-Tech Innovation Enterprises. Finance and Trade Dynamics. https://doi.org/10.63808/ftd.v2i1.299
Vancouver
Huang J, Zhang X, Jin H. How Do Government Guidance Funds Cultivate “Patient Capital”? —— An Empirical Study on Asymmetric Game Based on Investment Leverage and Exit Mechanism of Sci-Tech Innovation Enterprises. Finance and Trade Dynamics. 2026. doi:10.63808/ftd.v2i1.299
BibTeX
@article{Huang2026,
author = {Huang, Jingdong and Zhang, Xinyi and Jin, Hao},
title = {How Do Government Guidance Funds Cultivate “Patient Capital”? —— An Empirical Study on Asymmetric Game Based on Investment Leverage and Exit Mechanism of Sci-Tech Innovation Enterprises},
journal = {Finance and Trade Dynamics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.63808/ftd.v2i1.299}
}
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