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Legitimacy of the Interim Government of Bangladesh

Ehsan Siddiq

University of Asia Pacific Journal of law and Policy · 26.12.2024

DOI: 10.63755/sn22125/sl40 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift University of Asia Pacific Journal of law and Policy, online erschienen am 12.12.2024. Verfasst von Ehsan Siddiq.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The legitimacy of the Interim Government², sworn in on 8 August 2024, has sparked debate. Some justify it using the doctrine of necessity or Kelsen's \"Grundnorm\" shift, both of which have historically been used to support military takeovers.3 However, theories that fail to differentiate between a people's revolution and a military coup are unconvincing. This paper argues that the Interim Government, born from a mass uprising, stands on stronger foundations those derived from the people, not from abstract legal doctrines. In this paper it is argued that the Interim Government was formed and has obtained its legitimacy from a pre-constitutional power - the constituent power. The Bangladesh Constitution was framed and adopted in 1972 by the Constituent Assembly in exercise of its constituent power. According to Bangladeshi and Indian jurisprudence, this constituent power belonged to the people and was exercised on their behalf by the Constituent Assembly. In the hands of the people, the constituent power comprised the legislative, executive and judicial powers. There was no demarcation between the three powers as the doctrine of separation of powers did not apply to the constituent authority. According to Joel Colon-Rios, this approach emphasizes constituent power as a power found outside the domain of law, incapable of legal regulation. It is seen as a pre-political force that becomes juridically irrelevant once a constitutional order is in place. According to Colon-Rios constituent power is not the concern of lawyers. And hence we see a failure of lawyers to appreciate the events of August 2024. While adopting the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly distributed the constituent powers held by the people between the three organs of the State. According to Indian jurisprudence, once distributed, the people cannot thereafter exercise the constituent power.7 This view is supported by the German scholar, Martin Kriele who argues in favour of \"silencing\" the constituent power after it brings a constitution into effect, to protect the constitution from political unpredictability.8 According to this theory of constitution-making, once the Constitution is established, no constitutional order can exist that contradicts its provisions.9 Therefore, by this reasoning, the interim government, along with the positions of advisor and chief advisor, which are not recognized by the Constitution, lack legitimacy.

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APA

Siddiq, E. (2024). Legitimacy of the Interim Government of Bangladesh. University of Asia Pacific Journal of law and Policy. https://doi.org/10.63755/sn22125/sl40

Vancouver

Siddiq E. Legitimacy of the Interim Government of Bangladesh. University of Asia Pacific Journal of law and Policy. 2024. doi:10.63755/sn22125/sl40

BibTeX
@article{Siddiq2024,
  author = {Siddiq, Ehsan},
  title = {Legitimacy of the Interim Government of Bangladesh},
  journal = {University of Asia Pacific Journal of law and Policy},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.63755/sn22125/sl40}
}
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