Foreclosure of Contestability: Algorithmic Curation and Democratic Revisability 2/1. rész
Dunakavics · 18.11.2026 · 14 (11) · 33-48
DOI: 10.63684/dk.2026.11.03 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Dunakavics, online erschienen am 18.11.2026. Verfasst von Victor Papp. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Part One defined foreclosure as a condition in which democratic capacities remain possible in protected or deliberately constructed settings, yet the prevailing architecture of the public sphere no longer ordinarily reproduces them or composes dispersed instances at the scale of binding political decision. This second part performs the second of the five falsification tests stated there and specifies how the remaining four could be assessed. It examines three communicative dimensions of political judgement: sustained attention, shared epistemic validation, and protected reflection. Across all three, successful correction depends on actors and resources that do not govern the allocation of visibility, supporting the claim that these capacities remain possible without being ordinarily reproduced by the prevailing architecture. Adversarial recognition is treated separately, as an organisational precondition whose carriers predate algorithmic curation. Composition asks whether dispersed political claims stay traceable, remain recognisable through reformulation, and connect to institutional responses that return to public scrutiny. Comparative indicators specify how the untested conditions could be assessed, with democratic significance kept relative to the standard employed. A deliberative account treats the dimensions as constitutive, and polyarchy registers them in part. A minimalist account may place them outside its scope until electoral competition itself is affected. The final sections distinguish objective function, optimisation objective, and optimisation regime, then apply that distinction to strategic control and to national and European regulation. National initiatives intervene at the input layer. European regulation supplies the direct test. The Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, and the Artificial Intelligence Act constrain transparency and data access, risk governance, and market conduct. Article 38 of the Digital Services Act addresses the ranking logic itself and secures an alternative to profiling without replacing the governing objective. None of these instruments replaces the optimisation objective organising visibility. Technological fatalism is rejected; the second falsification condition remains unmet.
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APA
Papp, V. (2026). Foreclosure of Contestability: Algorithmic Curation and Democratic Revisability 2/1. rész. Dunakavics, 14(11), 33-48. https://doi.org/10.63684/dk.2026.11.03
Vancouver
Papp V. Foreclosure of Contestability: Algorithmic Curation and Democratic Revisability 2/1. rész. Dunakavics. 2026;14(11):33-48. doi:10.63684/dk.2026.11.03
BibTeX
@article{Papp2026,
author = {Papp, Victor},
title = {Foreclosure of Contestability: Algorithmic Curation and Democratic Revisability 2/1. rész},
journal = {Dunakavics},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {11},
pages = {33--48},
doi = {10.63684/dk.2026.11.03}
}
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