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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Después del Último Voto: Las dos Soluciones Informáticas Post-Electorales como Guardianas del Resultado Oficial en América Latina (2015–2026)

Adolfo Enrique Cortes Tarra

Ibero Ciencias - Revista Científica y Académica - ISSN 3072-7197 · 22.08.2026 · 5 (3) · 1864-1884

DOI: 10.63371/ic.v5.n3.a1518 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ibero Ciencias - Revista Científica y Académica - ISSN 3072-7197, online erschienen am 22.08.2026. Verfasst von Adolfo Enrique Cortes Tarra. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

When the cameras switch off and the country assumes the election is over, the stretch that decides it in law begins. Between the fast count on election night and the handing over of credentials lie days, sometimes weeks, in which a handful of software systems holds up the official result against challenges, recounts and suspicion. This article examines that stretch through the two solutions that structure it in Colombia: the technological platform for web publication of electoral results, which broadcasts the progress of the scrutiny at public and managerial levels with tally-sheet images, and the provision of communications for the advance of the scrutiny commissions, which connects more than a thousand commissions, in encrypted form, to a central monitoring and control system. Their operation, number and activation timing are compared with the equivalents in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, Brazil and Argentina during 2015–2026, drawing entirely on publicly available sources. Almost every country runs a scrutiny-divulgation system; few, by contrast, operate a dedicated, traceable communications layer connecting the scrutiny bodies with guarantees of encryption, hashing and logging. The Colombian case stands out for clearly separating public divulgation from the commissions' technical channel, for requiring a hash on every final tally sheet and an audit log of every transmission, and for a cybersecurity architecture uncommon in the region: dual data centres, a national help desk, active-active redundancy. Its tensions do not lie in the code. They lie in the duration of the legal scrutiny and in public pedagogy about the difference between the informative result and the official one, a gap that AI-assisted disinformation has learned to exploit. A comparative matrix is proposed and implications for cybersecurity, transparency and architecture are discussed.

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APA

Tarra, A. E. C. (2026). Después del Último Voto: Las dos Soluciones Informáticas Post-Electorales como Guardianas del Resultado Oficial en América Latina (2015–2026). Ibero Ciencias - Revista Científica y Académica - ISSN 3072-7197, 5(3), 1864-1884. https://doi.org/10.63371/ic.v5.n3.a1518

Vancouver

Tarra AEC. Después del Último Voto: Las dos Soluciones Informáticas Post-Electorales como Guardianas del Resultado Oficial en América Latina (2015–2026). Ibero Ciencias - Revista Científica y Académica - ISSN 3072-7197. 2026;5(3):1864-1884. doi:10.63371/ic.v5.n3.a1518

BibTeX
@article{Tarra2026,
  author = {Tarra, Adolfo Enrique Cortes},
  title = {Después del Último Voto: Las dos Soluciones Informáticas Post-Electorales como Guardianas del Resultado Oficial en América Latina (2015–2026)},
  journal = {Ibero Ciencias - Revista Científica y Académica - ISSN 3072-7197},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1864--1884},
  doi = {10.63371/ic.v5.n3.a1518}
}
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