Gender Neutrality in Personal Law: A Critical Analysis
International Journal of Law Management & Humanities · 20.11.2026 · 9 (VI) · 1233-1242
DOI: 10.63108/ijlmh.13213 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, online erschienen am 20.11.2026. Verfasst von Debarati Indu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Gender neutrality in personal law remains one of the most contested questions in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. Personal laws governing marriage, divorce, succession, maintenance, guardianship, and adoption evolved within patriarchal structures and are deeply tied to religion, custom, and community identity. Although Articles 14, 15, and 21 guarantee equality, non-discrimination, and dignity, these laws continue to contain provisions that are either overtly discriminatory or that perpetuate inequality in practice. This paper critically examines whether Indian personal law has evolved sufficiently to reflect constitutional morality, dignity, and inclusiveness. The paper begins with the constitutional framework, highlighting the tension between equality guarantees and religious freedom under Articles 25 and 26. It traces the judicial journey from State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (1952), which placed personal laws outside Article 13, to Joseph Shine and Navtej Singh Johar (2018), which emphasised constitutional morality over patriarchal and customary norms. The analysis then turns to Hindu personal law. Despite codification, patriarchal traces persist in the restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (T. Sareetha; Saroj Rani), in the “natural guardian” provision of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (Githa Hariharan), and in the historical exclusion of daughters from coparcenary rights, remedied by the 2005 Amendment and Vineeta Sharma (2020). The paper observes that formal reform has not always produced substantive equality, as social pressure often prevents women from claiming their rights. In relation to Muslim personal law, the paper discusses polygamy, instant triple talaq (Shayara Bano, 2017), and its criminalisation under the 2019 Act. It also traces the maintenance debate from Shah Bano (1985) through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Danial Latifi (2001) and Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024), and asks whether maintenance frameworks should recognise need and capacity rather than presume that financial dependency and responsibility follow gender. The exclusion of LGBTQ+ individuals is identified as a major limitation. While Navtej Singh Johar decriminalised homosexuality, same-sex couples remain without recognition in marriage, adoption, guardianship, and succession. In Supriyo Chakraborty v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court acknowledged discrimination but deferred to Parliament, exposing the limits of judicial activism in family law reform. The paper also considers the Uniform Civil Code debate under Article 44, weighing the argument that a UCC would remove discriminatory practices against the concern that uniformity may impose majoritarian norms and does not by itself guarantee justice, as the Goa civil code illustrates. The paper concludes that gender neutrality must avoid simplistic binaries. Gender-specific protections arose from historical disadvantage and cannot be withdrawn without addressing structural inequality, yet reliance on stereotypes about providers, caregivers, guardians, and heterosexual family forms conflicts with constitutional values. Courts have acted largely incrementally, and political and religious sensitivities slow reform. Genuine gender neutrality therefore requires both legal and social transformation, grounded in human dignity rather than gender stereotypes.
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APA
Indu, D., & Anushree, A. (2026). Gender Neutrality in Personal Law: A Critical Analysis. International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, 9(VI), 1233-1242. https://doi.org/10.63108/ijlmh.13213
Vancouver
Indu D, Anushree A. Gender Neutrality in Personal Law: A Critical Analysis. International Journal of Law Management & Humanities. 2026;9(VI):1233-1242. doi:10.63108/ijlmh.13213
BibTeX
@article{Indu2026,
author = {Indu, Debarati and Anushree, Arya},
title = {Gender Neutrality in Personal Law: A Critical Analysis},
journal = {International Journal of Law Management & Humanities},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
number = {VI},
pages = {1233--1242},
doi = {10.63108/ijlmh.13213}
}
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