Constitutional Limits on the Governor's Discretion in Government Formation in a Hung Legislative Assembly
International Journal of Law Management & Humanities · 18.08.2026 · 9 (IV) · 2206-2277
DOI: 10.63108/ijlmh.12715 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, online erschienen am 18.08.2026. Verfasst von Sadhasivam Alagappan und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 225 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The formation of a government in a hung Legislative Assembly presents one of the most delicate constitutional situations in India's parliamentary system. Where no political party secures a clear majority, the Governor is required to determine whom to invite to form the government before the question of legislative confidence can ultimately be settled on the floor of the House. This exercise raises a fundamental constitutional question: whether the Governor's discretionary power under Articles 163 and 164 of the Constitution is an unfettered political discretion or a structured constitutional power subject to identifiable limitations. This paper critically examines the constitutional limits governing the Governor's discretion in such circumstances by analysing the constitutional text, parliamentary conventions, the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions, and the evolving jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India. Particular attention is given to *Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab*, *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*, *Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India*, *Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker*, *Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly* and *Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra*. The study argues that although the Constitution recognises a limited area of gubernatorial discretion in the absence of a clear legislative majority, such discretion cannot be equated with personal or arbitrary choice. It is constrained by constitutional morality, democratic legitimacy, constitutional conventions, relevant judicial precedents and the requirement that competing claims to majority support ultimately be tested on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. The paper further examines the extent to which judicial review can operate as a constitutional safeguard against improper gubernatorial action. It concludes that the Governor's role in a hung Assembly is one of constitutional judgment rather than political preference, and that the exercise of discretion must remain directed towards facilitating the formation of a government capable of commanding the confidence of the elected House.
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APA
Alagappan, S., & Kumar, K. R. (2026). Constitutional Limits on the Governor's Discretion in Government Formation in a Hung Legislative Assembly. International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, 9(IV), 2206-2277. https://doi.org/10.63108/ijlmh.12715
Vancouver
Alagappan S, Kumar KR. Constitutional Limits on the Governor's Discretion in Government Formation in a Hung Legislative Assembly. International Journal of Law Management & Humanities. 2026;9(IV):2206-2277. doi:10.63108/ijlmh.12715
BibTeX
@article{Alagappan2026,
author = {Alagappan, Sadhasivam and Kumar, K. Rajesh},
title = {Constitutional Limits on the Governor's Discretion in Government Formation in a Hung Legislative Assembly},
journal = {International Journal of Law Management & Humanities},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
number = {IV},
pages = {2206--2277},
doi = {10.63108/ijlmh.12715}
}
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