BALANCING POWER IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS OF FRANCE, ROMANIA, AND POLAND
UMFST Law Review · 15.12.2025 · 2 · 2-17
DOI: 10.62838/umfstlr.2.01 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift UMFST Law Review, online erschienen am 15.12.2025. Verfasst von Delia Raluca HUDITA.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This comparative study examines the critical role of constitutional courts as arbiters in the high-tension, dual-executive systems of semi-presidentialism. By analyzing the sophisticated doctrines of France, the crisis-management trajectory of Romania including the controversial 2024 electoral annulment, and the constitutional capture of Poland, the author identifies the essential conditions for judicial independence. The article provides a deep dive into how courts translate abstract provisions into the concrete distribution of power between presidents, governments, and parliaments.
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APA
HUDITA, D. R. (2025). BALANCING POWER IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS OF FRANCE, ROMANIA, AND POLAND. UMFST Law Review, 2, 2-17. https://doi.org/10.62838/umfstlr.2.01
Vancouver
HUDITA DR. BALANCING POWER IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS OF FRANCE, ROMANIA, AND POLAND. UMFST Law Review. 2025;2:2-17. doi:10.62838/umfstlr.2.01
BibTeX
@article{HUDITA2025,
author = {HUDITA, Delia Raluca},
title = {BALANCING POWER IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS OF FRANCE, ROMANIA, AND POLAND},
journal = {UMFST Law Review},
year = {2025},
volume = {2},
pages = {2--17},
doi = {10.62838/umfstlr.2.01}
}
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