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Does Short Selling Enhance the Efficiency of Corporate Investments?

Deyang Ning

Journal of Economics and Law · 2026-08 · 3 (4) · 90-101

DOI: 10.62517/jel.202614411 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics and Law, 2026-08. Verfasst von Deyang Ning. Die Arbeit nennt 15 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Drawing on the establishment and evolution of China's margin trading and short selling framework, this study conducts a thorough analysis of the governance impact and fundamental processes through which the short selling system influences the investment efficiency of publicly traded firms.This research examines the effects, variations, and internal pathways through which this short selling system influences the efficiency of corporate investments. The analysis focuses on A-share listed firms traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China, using data from 2016 to 2025 as the study sample.Employing a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) framework alongside Richardson’s (2006) residual model to quantify inefficient investment levels, this research carries out empirical analyses across three aspects: baseline effects, heterogeneity traits, and channels of transmission. The results indicate that short-selling regulations play a pivotal role in lowering inefficiencies in investment, fostering greater investment efficiency, and delivering significant impacts in mitigating excessive investment while addressing insufficient investment.This enhancement is especially evident in companies that exhibit weaker internal controls and have less institutional ownership, highlighting how short-selling restrictions can act as a substitute for internal governance mechanisms. Additional analyses of the pathways reveal that short-selling rules boost the efficiency of corporate investments mainly through three avenues: elevating the accuracy of disclosed information and minimizing information gaps via feedback channels; reinforcing external oversight by increasing scrutiny of dominant stakeholders; and reducing reliance on short-term loans for long-term projects while refining capital structures under financing limitations.This research expands the theoretical understanding of how capital market institutions influence corporate investment activities at the micro level. It offers empirical insights and practical recommendations to help regulators refine short-selling policies and assist companies in enhancing their investment strategies and governance frameworks.

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APA

Ning, D. (2026). Does Short Selling Enhance the Efficiency of Corporate Investments?. Journal of Economics and Law, 3(4), 90-101. https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202614411

Vancouver

Ning D. Does Short Selling Enhance the Efficiency of Corporate Investments?. Journal of Economics and Law. 2026;3(4):90-101. doi:10.62517/jel.202614411

BibTeX
@article{Ning2026,
  author = {Ning, Deyang},
  title = {Does Short Selling Enhance the Efficiency of Corporate Investments?},
  journal = {Journal of Economics and Law},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {3},
  number = {4},
  pages = {90--101},
  doi = {10.62517/jel.202614411}
}
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