Does Short-Selling Curb Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling?-Quasi-Experimental Evidence from China’s 2023 Margin Trading Reform
Journal of Economics and Law · 2026-06 · 3 (3) · 48-59
DOI: 10.62517/jel.202614306 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics and Law, 2026-06. Verfasst von Ruifeng Li. Die Arbeit nennt 12 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Against the backdrop of severe Type II agency conflicts in China’s A-share market, my paper inspects how short-selling deregulation mitigates controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior. Using the 2023 expansion of margin trading eligible securities as an exogenous quasi-natural experiment, we apply a PSM-matched time-varying DID model for causal identification.Our baseline results show that easing short-selling restrictions significantly reduces tunneling: treated firms see a 20.2% relative drop in their comprehensive tunneling index, with consistent effects across three core tunneling channels. Mechanism analysis identifies stock price crash risk as a key partial mediator, explaining 36.8% of the total effect. We also document a substitution effect between short-selling and other governance mechanisms, with stronger effects for poorly governed, high-controlling-ownership, or high-insolvency-risk firms. All findings hold up to a full set of endogeneity and robustness checks.Further tests confirm that short-selling deregulation improves the market response to related party transactions and boosts firm value and operating performance. This study expands research on short-selling’s governance role in emerging markets, and offers empirical insights for optimizing China’s margin trading system.
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APA
Li, R. (2026). Does Short-Selling Curb Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling?-Quasi-Experimental Evidence from China’s 2023 Margin Trading Reform. Journal of Economics and Law, 3(3), 48-59. https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202614306
Vancouver
Li R. Does Short-Selling Curb Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling?-Quasi-Experimental Evidence from China’s 2023 Margin Trading Reform. Journal of Economics and Law. 2026;3(3):48-59. doi:10.62517/jel.202614306
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Ruifeng},
title = {Does Short-Selling Curb Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling?-Quasi-Experimental Evidence from China’s 2023 Margin Trading Reform},
journal = {Journal of Economics and Law},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {3},
pages = {48--59},
doi = {10.62517/jel.202614306}
}
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