Monetary Union without Fiscal Union? The Euro Crisis and the Move Towards European Fiscal Union
New Perspectives on Political Economy · 2015
DOI: 10.62374/38vs1m37 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift New Perspectives on Political Economy, 2015. Verfasst von Francesca Spigarelli und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro crisis through the lens of a robust political economy. Based on the history of monetary unions, monetary union is unlikely to survive without a fiscal union or strong constitutional constraints. The EMU has neither, and its institutional structure makes it unsustainable. Since the euro was (and is) fundamentally a political – rather than economic – project, we argue that policymakers will not allow the EMU to fail. Rather, continued movement towards greater EU-level fiscal, and ultimately a fiscal union, are likely.
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APA
Spigarelli, F., & Wenzel, N. G. (2015). Monetary Union without Fiscal Union? The Euro Crisis and the Move Towards European Fiscal Union. New Perspectives on Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.62374/38vs1m37
Vancouver
Spigarelli F, Wenzel NG. Monetary Union without Fiscal Union? The Euro Crisis and the Move Towards European Fiscal Union. New Perspectives on Political Economy. 2015. doi:10.62374/38vs1m37
BibTeX
@article{Spigarelli2015,
author = {Spigarelli, Francesca and Wenzel, Nikolai G .},
title = {Monetary Union without Fiscal Union? The Euro Crisis and the Move Towards European Fiscal Union},
journal = {New Perspectives on Political Economy},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.62374/38vs1m37}
}
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