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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing for a Dishonest Majority

Yi-Hsiu Chen, Yehuda Lindell

IACR Communications in Cryptology · 09.04.2024

DOI: 10.62056/ak2isgvtw ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 09.04.2024. Verfasst von Yi-Hsiu Chen und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 15-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 10 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocols enable parties to share secrets while guaranteeing security (in particular, that all parties hold valid and consistent shares) even if the dealer or some of the participants are malicious. Most work on VSS focuses on the honest majority case, primarily since it enables one to guarantee output delivery (e.g., a corrupted recipient cannot prevent an honest dealer from sharing their value). Feldman's VSS is a well known and popular protocol for this task and relies on the discrete log hardness assumption. In this paper, we present a variant of Feldman's VSS for the dishonest majority setting and formally prove its security. Beyond the basic VSS protocol, we present a publicly-verifiable version, as well as show how to securely add participants to the sharing and how to refresh an existing sharing (all secure in the presence of a dishonest majority). We prove that our protocols are UC secure, for appropriately defined ideal functionalities.

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APA

Chen, Y., & Lindell, Y. (2024). Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing for a Dishonest Majority. IACR Communications in Cryptology. https://doi.org/10.62056/ak2isgvtw

Vancouver

Chen Y, Lindell Y. Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing for a Dishonest Majority. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2024. doi:10.62056/ak2isgvtw

BibTeX
@article{Chen2024,
  author = {Chen, Yi-Hsiu and Lindell, Yehuda},
  title = {Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing for a Dishonest Majority},
  journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.62056/ak2isgvtw}
}
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