Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example
IACR Communications in Cryptology · 09.04.2024
DOI: 10.62056/ahjbksdja ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 09.04.2024. Verfasst von Gabrielle De Micheli und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this work, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the classical public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.
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APA
Micheli, G. D., & Heninger, N. (2024). Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example. IACR Communications in Cryptology. https://doi.org/10.62056/ahjbksdja
Vancouver
Micheli GD, Heninger N. Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2024. doi:10.62056/ahjbksdja
BibTeX
@article{Micheli2024,
author = {Micheli, Gabrielle De and Heninger, Nadia},
title = {Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example},
journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.62056/ahjbksdja}
}
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