EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example

Gabrielle De Micheli, Nadia Heninger

IACR Communications in Cryptology · 09.04.2024

DOI: 10.62056/ahjbksdja ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 09.04.2024. Verfasst von Gabrielle De Micheli und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this work, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the classical public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.

Zitieren

APA

Micheli, G. D., & Heninger, N. (2024). Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example. IACR Communications in Cryptology. https://doi.org/10.62056/ahjbksdja

Vancouver

Micheli GD, Heninger N. Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2024. doi:10.62056/ahjbksdja

BibTeX
@article{Micheli2024,
  author = {Micheli, Gabrielle De and Heninger, Nadia},
  title = {Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example},
  journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.62056/ahjbksdja}
}
Kostenlos starten →