SoK: PQC PAKEs Design, Security and Performance
IACR Communications in Cryptology · 03.08.2026 · 3 (2)
DOI: 10.62056/a6n5txl7s ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 03.08.2026. Verfasst von Nouri Alnahawi und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 256 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) establishes secure communication channels using passwords for authentication. Currently, standardized PAKEs rely on classical asymmetric cryptography. However, these PAKEs may become insecure should the expected quantum threat become a reality. Despite the growing interest in realizing quantum-safe PAKEs, they did not receive much attention from the ongoing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) integration efforts. Hence, there is a significant awareness gap compared to PQC primitives subject to the official standardization processes. We provide a comprehensive overview of existing PQC PAKEs, classify their design rationales and authentication methods, and address aspects related to their security and performance. We identify PAKE designs that are still unexplored in the PQC realm and discuss the possibility of their adaptation. Thus, we offer a detailed reference for future work on PQC PAKEs.
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APA
Alnahawi, N., Haas, D., Mauß, E., & Wiesmaier, A. (2026). SoK: PQC PAKEs Design, Security and Performance. IACR Communications in Cryptology, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.62056/a6n5txl7s
Vancouver
Alnahawi N, Haas D, Mauß E, Wiesmaier A. SoK: PQC PAKEs Design, Security and Performance. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2026;3(2). doi:10.62056/a6n5txl7s
BibTeX
@article{Alnahawi2026,
author = {Alnahawi, Nouri and Haas, David and Mauß, Erik and Wiesmaier, Alexander},
title = {SoK: PQC PAKEs Design, Security and Performance},
journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {2},
doi = {10.62056/a6n5txl7s}
}
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