Diving Deep Into UC
IACR Communications in Cryptology · 04.05.2026 · 3 (1)
DOI: 10.62056/a6n56chdj ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 04.05.2026. Verfasst von Céline Chevalier und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Introduced by Canetti in 2001, Universal Composability (UC) is a widely adopted security model that enables the specification and proof of security for a broad range of protocols, offering strong security guarantees. At its core lies the universal composition theorem (UC theorem), which ensures that protocols proven secure within the framework remain secure even when deployed in real-world environments with multiple instances of them. In this work, we present two key contributions. First, we identify several problems with the UC framework, in particular the UC Theorem. They include counterexamples, limitations that make it unusable for important classes of protocols, and weaknesses in its proof. These problems reveal flaws in nearly all the fundamental concepts of UC. Second, we propose a revised formulation of the main concepts of UC to address these issues. Although the resulting modifications are nontrivial, our updated definitions are designed to remain as faithful as possible to the structure and intent of the original model.
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APA
Chevalier, C., & Sageloli, É. (2026). Diving Deep Into UC. IACR Communications in Cryptology, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.62056/a6n56chdj
Vancouver
Chevalier C, Sageloli É. Diving Deep Into UC. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2026;3(1). doi:10.62056/a6n56chdj
BibTeX
@article{Chevalier2026,
author = {Chevalier, Céline and Sageloli, Éric},
title = {Diving Deep Into UC},
journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {1},
doi = {10.62056/a6n56chdj}
}
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