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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Non-Profiled Higher-Order Side-Channel Attacks against Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography

Tolun Tosun, Elisabeth Oswald, Erkay Savaş

IACR Communications in Cryptology · 06.10.2025 · 2 (3)

DOI: 10.62056/a0txl8n4e ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 06.10.2025. Verfasst von Tolun Tosun und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this work, we present methods for conducting higher-order non-profiled side-channel attacks on Lattice-Based Cryptography (LBC). Our analysis covers two scenarios: one where the device leakage is known and follows Hamming weight model, and another where the leakage model is not Hamming weight based and unknown to the attacker. We focus on the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards, the Dilithium digital signature (i.e. ML-DSA) and the Kyber key encapsulation (i.e. ML-KEM) algorithms. For Hamming weight leakage, we develop efficient higher-order Correlation Power Analysis (HOCPA) attacks in which the attacker must compute a function known as the optimal prediction function. We revisit the definition of optimal prediction function and introduce a recursive method for computing it efficiently. Our approach is particularly useful when a closed-form formula is unavailable, as in LBC. Then, we introduce sin and cos prediction functions, which prove optimal for HOCPA attacks against second and higher-order masking protection. We validate our methods through simulations and real-device experiments on open-source masked implementations of Dilithium and Kyber on an Arm Cortex-M4. On the real device, we achieve full secret-key recovery using only 700 and 2400 traces for second and third-order masked implementations of Dilithium, and 2200 and 14500 traces for second and third-order masked implementations of Kyber, respectively. For the unknown leakage scenarios, we leverage generic Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) distinguishers. A key challenge here is the injectivity of modular multiplications in NTT based polynomial multiplication, typically addressed by bit-dropping in the literature. However, we experimentally show that bit-dropping is largely inefficient against protected implementations of LBC. To overcome this limitation, we present a novel two-step attack to Kyber, combining generic distinguishers and lattice reduction techniques. Our approach decreases the number of predictions from q^2 to q and does not rely on bit-dropping. Our experimental results demonstrate a speed-up of up to 23490x in attack run-time over the baseline along with improved success rate. In certain scenarios, higher-order attacks become feasible only through the proposed approach, as classical methods are shown to be unsuccessful.

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APA

Tosun, T., Oswald, E., & Savaş, E. (2025). Non-Profiled Higher-Order Side-Channel Attacks against Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography. IACR Communications in Cryptology, 2(3). https://doi.org/10.62056/a0txl8n4e

Vancouver

Tosun T, Oswald E, Savaş E. Non-Profiled Higher-Order Side-Channel Attacks against Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2025;2(3). doi:10.62056/a0txl8n4e

BibTeX
@article{Tosun2025,
  author = {Tosun, Tolun and Oswald, Elisabeth and Savaş, Erkay},
  title = {Non-Profiled Higher-Order Side-Channel Attacks against Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography},
  journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.62056/a0txl8n4e}
}
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